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Preface 
This paper reviews the current state of the debate on EU budget and policy reform, and 
developments during 2009-10, focusing in particular on the future of Cohesion policy after 
2013. The paper was prepared by the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) under the 
aegis of EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research Consortium), which is a grouping of 
national government authorities from countries across Europe. The Consortium provides 
sponsorship for the EPRC to undertake regular monitoring and comparative analysis of the 
regional policies of European countries and the inter-relationships with EU Cohesion and 
Competition policies. EoRPA members currently comprise the following partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
x Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale (DATAR), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry for Economics 
and Technology), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Ministry of Economics, SMEs and Energy of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen) 
 
Italy 
x Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per lo sviluppo e la coesione economica (Department for Development 
and Economic Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
United Kingdom 
x Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
x The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
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The research for this paper was undertaken by EPRC in consultation with EoRPA partners. It 
involved a programme of desk research and fieldwork visits among national and regional 
authorities in sponsoring countries and European institutions during Spring/Summer 2010. 
The paper has been drafted by Carlos Mendez, Professor John Bachtler and Fiona Wishlade. 
It draws on country-specific research contributed by the following research team: 
x Dr Sara Davies (Germany) x Dr Irene McMaster and Dr Katja Mirwaldt 
(EU12) together with country specialists 
x Dr Martin Ferry (Poland) x Carlos Mendez (Portugal, Spain) 
x Dr Martin Ferry & Rona Michie (United 
Kingdom) 
x Dr Katja Mirwaldt and Frederike Gross 
(Luxembourg) 
x Frederike Gross (France) x Laura Polverari (Italy) 
x Frederike Gross and Dr Katja Mirwaldt 
(Belgium) 
x Viktoria Chorafa (Greece) 
x Professor Henrik Halkier (Denmark) x Heidi Vironen (Finland, Sweden) 
x Stefan Kah (Austria) x Professor Douglas Yuill (The 
Netherlands, Norway) 
x Dr Irene McMaster (Ireland)  
Many thanks to everyone who participated in the research. The European Policies Research 
Centre also gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by Sponsors of the 
EoRPA Consortium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
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SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE REFORM OF COHESION POLICY 
AFTER 2013 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper provides a review and assessment of the current state of the debate on the 
future of Cohesion policy. It begins, by setting out the context for reform in terms of 
economic governance, institutional changes and the policy priorities of Europe 2020. It then 
reviews the state-of-play of the budget debate, highlighting different national positions. 
For Cohesion policy, an analysis is provided of one of the key issues underlying Member 
State positions  their eligibility for Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the likely financial 
allocations, based on the latest Eurostat data. The political and policy dimensions of 
Cohesion policy reform are reviewed in detail, and the paper concludes with issues and 
questions for discussion. 
Context for reform 
EU budget reform has been in a state of flux over the last year, with limited legislative 
progress since the end of the consultation process in late 2008. The economic crisis has 
dominated the EU agenda with important consequences for economic governance and new 
ideas on the use of EU budgetary conditionalities emerging. On the political and 
institutional front, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (December 2009), the 
appointment of a new Commission and College of Commissioners (February 2010) and 
European Council agreement on the Europe 2020 strategy (March and June 2010) have set 
the stage for a new, critical phase of budgetary and policy reform. Of particular relevance 
is Europe 2020 - the overarching, long-term economic strategy for the European Union. It 
succeeds the renewed Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, and sets out three mutually 
reinforcing priorities of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.  
The state of play on EU budget reform  
The EU budgetary review process was launched by the Commission in September 2007 but, 
since the conclusion of the consultation, the Commission has made little public statement 
on the future of the EU budget. In November 2009, a leaked draft of a DG Budget 
Communication proposed that EU spending should be focused on three key axes: sustainable 
growth and jobs; climate and energy; and global Europe. With respect to Cohesion policy, 
the leaked paper recommended a concentration of resources on nat ional  convergence, and 
regional disparities wit hin countries. It questioned the value of Regional Competitiveness & 
Employment (RCE) funding. However, the DG Budget non-paper attracted significant 
criticisms, especially from regional development institutional interests.  
Meanwhile, the process of preparing positions on the EU budget by other EU institutions has 
advanced over the past year. Virtually all Member States provided formal responses to the 
consultation, but there have been very few additional formal government statements or 
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position papers on budgetary reform published. Many Member States expect to develop 
clearer negotiating mandates in response to the Commissions forthcoming budget paper.  
Cohesion policy scenarios 2014+: eligibility and allocations 
Future eligibility scenarios under EU Cohesion policy on the basis of the latest statistical 
data and EU27 coverage reveals that there would be a significant shift in coverage, with the 
scope of the Convergence and Phasing-out regions considerably reduced and higher 
coverage under Phasing-in and RCE status. At a global level, Convergence coverage would 
fall from 31.7 percent to 24.4 percent of the EU27 population, with coverage concentrated 
in 15 rather than 18 Member States, as previously. Seven Member States would lose 
population coverage; two (Italy and Greece) would gain; the remainder would remain 
unchanged. Phasing-out coverage would be relatively marginal  fewer than 7 million 
population, compared with over 16 million in 2007-13. By contrast, Phasing-in coverage 
would increase, concentrated in a few countries, notably Germany and Spain. RCE coverage 
would remain heavily concentrated in EU15. Lastly, Greece would cease to be eligible for 
the Cohesion Fund, leaving only Portugal eligible among the EU15 Member States. 
The existing approach to Convergence region and Cohesion Fund allocations cannot be 
reapplied largely unchanged because the budget for these two strands of policy would 
exceed that for 2007-13, even though the eligible population is substantially smaller. 
Among the main options to address this are: to mechanistically reduce the Convergence 
allocation for all eligible regions to constrain the allocation within a fixed budget;  to 
mechanistically reduce the Convergence allocation with different reduction coefficients for 
EU12 and EU15; or to reconfigure the capping approach. Whatever the scope for tweaking 
the Berlin formula and the capping methodology, it is questionable whether the existing 
architecture for determining Cohesion policy allocations is robust enough to be rolled 
forward in such changed economic conditions. 
Cohesion policy directions 2014+: performance, process and perspectives 
Looking forward at the substance of policy, the extensive investment in evaluation and 
other research has continued over the past year, with further insights on the performance 
of the policy supplemented by the first strategic reports from Member States. The 
Commission has also been mobilising debate on the future of the policy, particularly 
through the High-Level Group of Member States.  
The Fifth Cohesion Report is currently being finalised and is due for publication in 
November 2010. In addition to its analytical role in assessing the state of cohesion in the EU, 
the Report will bring together the conclusions of research and debate with a series of 
proposals for 2014-2020. At it heart is a conception of Cohesion policy as a delivery vehicle 
for achieving the Europe 2020 objectives of smart, inclusive and sustainable growth, while 
recognising the founding Treaty-based objective of cohesion. It will propose several ways 
for enhancing the European added value of the policy through greater concentration, 
conditionalities and a performance focus, and it will seek to streamline and simplify the 
delivery system.  
Setting the stage for the reform of Cohesion policy after 2013 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 77  European Policies Research Centre vii
Interviews with national policy-makers reveal universal agreement on EU Cohesion policy 
being closely aligned with Europe 2020 and its key objectives. However, sufficient 
flexibility is also called for to adapt EU priorities to different domestic contexts.  
With regard to performance-enhancing measures, the use of financial conditionalities and 
incentives is generally viewed with scepticism, particularly because of methodological 
challenges. Reinforced monitoring and evaluation could be supported, but as long as the 
current devolved and needs-based approach is not disrupted. To improve the quality and 
utility of strategic reporting, national policymakers argue that the reports should 
concentrate on strategic issues and agreement should be sought on standard core indicators 
to allow comparison across countries, while the need for a more structured high-level 
debate in the Council has received mixed reactions. Institutional capacity is increasingly 
recognised as being critical to effective performance, but this is largely viewed to be a 
domestic concern. 
On the issue of strategic coherence between EU policies, national policymakers are 
supportive of proposals of a common strategic framework for cohesion policy, rural 
development policy and maritime and fisheries policy. A related priority is the need to 
agree on harmonised management rules, eligibility conditions and operational coordination 
between the Structural Funds and with other EU policies. More complementarity between 
the Structural Funds and Rural Development is a priority, but not all policymakers consider 
that rural development should be reintegrated into Cohesion policy.  
There is universal agreement on the need to simplify implementation rules and procedures, 
particularly concerning financial management and control. Other proposals with strong 
support include lighter administrative requirements for specific types of interventions or 
beneficiaries, a more flexible decommitment rule and the facilitation of partial closure. 
Resolving the burden of financial management, control and audit is also seen as the key 
issue for improving the role of the Commission within Cohesion policy and allowing it to 
adopt a more strategic stance. However, this would also require additional human 
resources, more training of Commission staff and more effective inter- and intra-DG 
coordination.  
Issues for discussion  
A preliminary set of questions for discussion at the EoRPA meeting are: 
x What kind of changes to the Berlin formula for allocating Cohesion policy funding 
could be considered to stay within budgetary limits and ensure sufficiently wide 
political support? 
x How should the approach to shared management of Cohesion policy evolve? 
x What kind of conditionalities on Cohesion policy spending would be acceptable to 
Member States? 
x What scope is there for widening the use of different financial instruments? 
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SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE REFORM OF COHESION POLICY 
AFTER 2013 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As the Fifth Cohesion Report is finalised, the stage is being set for the important, 
negotiation phase of Cohesion policy reform. The proposals for a regional development 
strategy for 2020 come at a critical time for the policy, which has been under internal and 
external pressure. As in 2004-05, several of the net payer Member States are concerned 
about the cost of their budget contributions, exacerbated by current public expenditure 
constraints in the wake of fiscal retrenchment. Cohesion policy, along with the Common 
Agricultural Policy, are the main areas of EU spending likely to be targeted for cutbacks. 
Within the European Commission, the launch of the Europe 2020 has given a high profile to 
new EU priorities for which extra funding is sought. As previous EoRPA papers have 
illustrated, 1  Cohesion policy has been under attack for its performance, especially the 
ambiguous evidence for the effectiveness of spending, the administrative complexity of 
management and implementation requirements, and the relatively high level of 
irregularities. 
All EU reform debates are protracted, but the recent discussions on reforming Cohesion 
policy have been longer than any hitherto. Hardly had the new 2007-13 programmes been 
launched in 2007 than the first consultation on the future of the policy was launched on the 
back of the future-oriented questions in the Fourth Cohesion Report. The independent 
Barca Report on the future of the policy was commissioned in late 2007, reporting in 2009, 
followed by an orientations paper from Commissioner Hübner and a reflections paper from 
Commissioner Samecki. Along the way, a Green Paper on territorial cohesion was prepared, 
and the biggest ever evaluation exercise was conducted by DG Regio to assess the 
effectiveness of the policy in 2000-06 along with a series of other studies to inform future 
thinking.  
The Fifth Cohesion Report, due for publication in November 2010, and the Cohesion Forum 
planned for March 2011, are two further important milestones. In addition to its analytical 
role in assessing the state of cohesion in the EU, the Report will bring together the 
conclusions of research and debate with a series of proposals for 2014-2020. At it heart is a 
conception of Cohesion policy as a delivery vehicle for achieving the Europe 2020 objectives 
of smart, inclusive and sustainable growth. It will propose several ways for enhancing the 
European added value of the policy through greater concentration, conditionalities and a 
performance focus, and it will seek to streamline and simplify the delivery system. However, 
                                                 
1  For example, see: Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade (2009) Chal lenges, Consult at ions and 
Concept s: Preparing for t he Cohesion Pol icy Debat e, EoRPA Paper 09/6, European Policies Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.  Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade (2009) Ideas for 
Budget  and Pol icy Reform: Reviewing t he Debate on Cohesion Pol icy 2014+, EoRPA Paper 09/5, 
European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.     
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the conclusions have yet to be finalised  and some key issues, such as the relationship 
between the ERDF and ESF, have still to be agreed.  
The context for the Report will be provided by the results of the budget review to be 
published by the Commission in October 2010. In charting the priorities for future EU 
spending and mechanisms for revenue-generation, it will reveal the thinking shaping the 
proposals for the next Financial Perspective, due in Spring 2011. Followed by the legislative 
package for Cohesion policy in Summer 2010, the starting gun will have been fired for the 
negotiations on the EU budget for the post-2013 period.  
Against this backdrop, this paper provides a review and assessment of the current state of 
the debate on the future of Cohesion policy. It begins, in Section 2, by setting out the 
context for reform in terms of economic governance, institutional changes and the policy 
priorities of Europe 2020. Section 3 reviews the state-of-play of the budget debate, 
highlighting different national positions. Section 4 then focuses on one of the key issues 
underlying Member State positions  their eligibility for Structural and Cohesion Funds, and 
the likely financial allocations, based on the latest Eurostat data. The political and policy 
dimensions of Cohesion policy reform are the subject of Section 5, and the paper concludes 
with issues and questions for discussion in Section 6. 
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2. THE CONTEXT FOR POLICY REFORM  
EU budget reform has been in a state of flux over the last year, with limited legislative 
progress since the end of the consultation process in late 2008. The economic crisis has 
dominated the EU agenda with important consequences for economic governance and new 
ideas on the use of EU budgetary conditionalities emerging. On the political and 
institutional front, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (December 2009), the 
appointment of a new Commission and College of Commissioners (February 2010) and 
European Council agreement on the Europe 2020 strategy (March and June 2010) have set 
the stage for a new, critical phase of budgetary and policy reform. 
2.1 Economic governance  
Over the past year the fallout from the financial and economic crisis has dominated the EU 
agenda with important consequences for economic governance. A Greek debt crisis erupted 
in January when it was discovered that the country's deficits were twice as large as it had 
reported. This led to a fall in Greeces sovereign debt rating and speculative attacks on the 
euro. Although initially hesitant to react, the EU Member States, the European Central Bank 
and the Commission responded with a strong and concerted package of initiatives to ensure 
financial stability, support growth and employment, and to strengthen the economic 
governance system of the EU: 
x a task force was set to reform EU and euro zone economic governance, comprised 
of EU27 Finance Ministers and chaired by European Council President Herman Van 
Rompuy (26 March 2010); 
x an emergency aid mechanism for Greece was agreed worth 30 billion (11 April 
2010);  
x a stabilisation mechanism of 750 billion was set up to protect the euro (10 May 
2010); 
x and a Commission Communication proposed to strengthen EU economic governance, 
including reinforced ex-ante budgetary surveillance through early mutual 
surveillance and peer review of national budgets and tougher sanctions for 
countries breaking budget deficit and debt limits (12 May 2010).2 
With an eye on the future reform of Cohesion policy, the above-mentioned Commission 
Communication stated that “ Cohesion pol icy should have a clearer role t o play in 
support ing Member St at es act ions t o address st ructural  weaknesses and compet it iveness 
chal lenges….part icularly wit h a view t o st rengt hening inst it ut ional capacit y and ef f iciency 
of  publ ic administ rat ions.”  It also called for more rigorous and stricter enforcement of 
                                                 
2 European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Reinforcing Economic Pol icy Coordinat ion, COM(2010) 
250 final, 12.5.2010, Brussels. 
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existing conditionalities on the Cohesion Fund  as linked to breaches of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) - during the current financial perspectives.  
Further Commission thinking on these issues was set out in a follow-up Communication in 
June 2010.3 It anticipated the establishment of ex-ante conditionalities for Cohesion policy 
in its future reform proposals, by linking Cohesion disbursements to structural and 
institutional reforms. Although not specified in the Communication, potential candidates 
are likely to include business regulation and, in the environment field, water pricing and 
user-charging policies, given the high volume of funding channelled into business support 
and basic water infrastructures. 
With respect to the fiscal corrective arm, a new system of financial sanctions and 
incentives was proposed to ensure compliance with SGP rules. These would apply to 
expenditure under Cohesion policy, the CAP and the Fisheries Fund. However, a 
qualification was noted in relation to the CAP and Fisheries Fund, by excluding the 
possibility of farmer and fisherman income being affected; conditionality on payments 
would target EU reimbursements to national budgets and Member States would have to 
continue to pay the farm and fisheries subsidies. Lastly, it suggested that other incentives 
could be set up, such as a performance reserve or the modulation of co-financing rates. 
2.2 Political and institutional context 
After eight years of intense negotiation, the Lisbon Treaty finally came into force on 1 
December 2009 following the second Irish referendum vote on 2 October 2009 and 
ratification by all EU27 Member States. The Treatys stated aim is to enhance the 
efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improve the coherence of its 
action. Important changes were made to EU institutions and decision-making processes, 
most prominently an extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of 
Ministers; increased power for the European Parliament in the legislative process through 
extended co-decision with the Council of Ministers; and the creation of a President of the 
European Council (Herman Van Rompuy) and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (Baroness Catherine Ashton) to present a common EU position on 
the world stage.   
The main implications of the Lisbon Treaty for Cohesion policy are two-fold. First, there is 
a new title on economic, social and territorial cohesion. The concept of territorial 
cohesion is not defined and the traditional goal of reducing regional disparities has not 
changed, but a more specific reference to the regions deserving particular attention is 
included in the Treaty, namely: rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition and 
regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as 
the northernmost regions with very low population density and island, cross-border and 
                                                 
3 European Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enhancing Economic Pol icy Coordinat ion for St abil i t y,  
Growt h and Jobs – Tools for St ronger EU Economic Governance, COM(2010) 367/2, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
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mountain regions.   Second, Cohesion policy legislation is now decided on the basis of co-
decision through the so-called ordinary legislative procedure, providing the Parliament with 
stronger decision-making power vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers across the entire 
legislative package of regulations. 
In September 2009, José Manuel Barroso was re-elected by the European Parliament for a 
second term of office as President of the European Commission. The appointment of a new 
College of Commissioners was interrupted due to the delayed ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, obliging Barroso to extend the mandate of the previous College pending Treaty 
approval. Following this, the European Parliament elected the new European Commission 
and College of Commissioners on 9 February 2010 for a four year period, including a 
representative of each of the 27 EU Member States. The Cohesion policy portfolios were 
taken up by Commissioner Johann Hahn, following Pamel Sameckis six-month term in 
office at DG Regional Policy, and Commissioner László Andor, to replace Vladimir Spidla at 
DG Employment, Social and Equal Opportunities. 
The new Commission published its 2010 Work Programme at the end of March 2010,4 setting 
out the key policy and legislative issues to be taken forward in the coming years. A 
particular emphasis was placed on the launch of the Europe 2020 strategy for sustainable 
growth and jobs (see below), enhancing the rights and security of European citizens, and 
strengthening Europes role on the world stage. These political priorities were reiterated in 
Barrosos first ever State of the Union address to the European Parliament (as foreseen in 
the Lisbon Treaty) in September 2010 on the programme for the year ahead, as well as 
reaching agreement on the Commissions economic governance proposals and the launch of 
the negotiations on the EU budget.5 
Political change has also been evident in some Member States over the past year. Changes 
of government and a rise of more eurosceptic views have been witnessed in the UK (May), 
Sweden (September) and the Netherlands (where coalition negotiations are ongoing). By 
contrast, a new Czech coalition (July) has a more moderate eurosceptic stance than the 
previous government, while the Presidential elections in Poland (July) have strengthened 
the position of the existing pro-Europe government. 
2.3 The Europe 2020 strategy 
Europe 2020 is the overarching, long-term economic strategy for the European Union. It 
succeeds the renewed Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, which was scheduled to end in 
2010. Following a relatively quick public consultation, the Commission put forward its 
proposal for the EU 2020 strategy on 3 March 2010.6 The strap-line objective is to “ t urn t he 
                                                 
4 European Commission (2010a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Commission Work Programme 2010, Time to act .  
5 José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, St at e of  t he Union 2010, 7 
September 2010, European Parlimament, Strasbourg.  
6  European Comission (2010b) Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 A st rat egy for 
smart , sust ainable and inclusive growt h, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, 3.3.2010 
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EU int o a smart , sustainable and inclusive economy del ivering high levels of  employment , 
product ivit y and social  cohesion” . To pursue this objective, three mutually reinforcing 
priorities have been set: 
x Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation. 
x Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more 
competitive economy. 
x Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and 
territorial cohesion.  
In line with these priorities, five headline targets were defined to be adapted at national 
level and seven flagship initiatives were identified where joint action would be initiated on 
innovation, youth, the digital agenda, resource efficiency, industrial policy, skills and jobs 
and the fight against poverty (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Overview of Europe 2020 
HEADLINE TARGETS 
1) Raise the employment rate of the population aged 20-64 from the current 69% to at least 75% 
2) Achieve the target of investing 3% of GDP in R&D in particular by improving the conditions for R&D 
investment by the private sector, and develop a new indicator to track innovation 
3) Reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 levels or by 30% if the 
conditions are right, increase the share of renewable energy in our final energy consumption to 20%, 
and achieve a 20% increase in energy efficiency 
4) Reduce the share of early school leavers to 10% from the current 15% and increase the share of the 
population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary education from 31% to at least 40%. 
5) Reduce the number of Europeans living below national poverty lines by 25%, lifting 20 million 
people out of poverty 
SMART GROWTH SUSTAINABLE GROWTH INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
INNOVATION 
EU flagship initiative "Innovation 
Union" to improve framework 
conditions and access to finance 
for research and innovation so as 
to strengthen the innovation 
chain and boost levels of 
investment throughout the Union. 
CLIMATE, ENERGY AND 
MOBILITY 
EU flagship initiative "Resource 
efficient Europe" to help 
decouple economic growth 
from the use of resources, by 
decarbonising our economy, 
increasing the use of 
renewable sources, 
modernising our transport 
sector and promoting energy 
efficiency. 
EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS 
EU flagship initiative "An 
agenda for new skills and jobs" 
to modernise labour markets 
by facilitating labour mobility 
and the development of skills 
throughout the lifecycle with a 
view to increase labour 
participation and better match 
labour supply and demand. EDUCATION 
EU flagship initiative "Youth on 
the move" to enhance the 
performance of education 
systems and to reinforce the 
international attractiveness of 
Europe's higher education. 
DIGITAL SOCIETY 
 
EU flagship initiative "A digital 
agenda for Europe" to speed up 
the roll-out of high-speed 
internet and reap the benefits of 
a digital single market for 
households and firms. 
COMPETITIVENESS 
EU flagship initiative "An 
industrial policy for the 
globalisation era" to improve 
the business environment, 
especially for SMEs, and to 
support the development of a 
strong and sustainable 
industrial base able to 
compete globally. 
FIGHTING POVERTY 
EU flagship initiative "European 
platform against poverty" to 
ensure social and territorial 
cohesion such that the benefits 
of growth and jobs are widely 
shared and people 
experiencing poverty and social 
exclusion are enabled to live in 
dignity and take an active part 
in society. 
Source: European Commission (2010a), Annex 1 
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The Commissions proposals were endorsed by the European Council in March 2010 - except 
for some of the headline targets which were subsequently agreed in June 2010  providing 
the Commission with a mandate to draft economic policy and employment guidelines to 
steer the next round of National Reform Programmes.7 The guidelines were integrated and 
formally agreed through a Council recommendation on economic guidelines8 and a draft 
decision on employment guidelines, which is still awaiting Parliamentary assent (see Box 1). 
Box 1: The Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines 
1. Ensuring the quality and the sustainability of public finances 
2. Addressing macroeconomic imbalances 
3. Reducing imbalances in the euro area 
4. Optimising support for research, development and innovation, strengthening the 
knowledge triangle and unleashing the potential of the digital economy 
5. Improving resource efficiency and reducing greenhouse gases 
6. Improving the business and consumer environment and modernising the industrial base in 
order to ensure the full functioning of the internal market 
7. Increasing labour market participation and reducing structural unemployment 
8. Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs, promoting job quality 
and lifelong learning 
9. Improving the performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing 
participation in tertiary education 
10. Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty 
 
 
To encourage more effective delivery and increased ownership, the governance model for 
Europe 2020 includes three key innovations compared to the previous Lisbon strategy. First, 
the European Council is now clearly responsible for coordinating the process, on the basis of 
Commission proposals. Second, the Commission has a new ability to issue country specific 
recommendations and policy warnings. Third, the system of Member State reporting on the 
achievement of 2020 targets is more coordinated with the Stability and Growth Pact 
reporting system, the latter now including a legal obligation to report on macroeconomic 
and public finance reform.  
With the new Parliament and the Commission in place and the Treaty of Lisbon entering 
into force, the stage is now set for the critical debates and legislative process to proceed 
on the new financial perspective for the post-2014 period. 
                                                 
7 European Commission (2010c) Recommendat ion for a Council  recommendat ion on broad guidel ines 
for t he economic pol icies of  t he Member St at es and of  t he Union Part I of the Europe 2020 Integrated 
Guidelines, COM(2010) 193 final, 27.4.2010, Brussels; European Commission (2010d) Proposal for a 
Council  decision on guidel ines for t he employment  pol icies of  t he Member St at es Part  II of  t he 
Europe 2020 Int egrat ed Guidel ines, COM(2010) 193 final, 27.4.2010, Brussels. 
8  Council of the European Union (2010) Council  Recommendat ion on broad guidel ines for t he 
economic pol icies of  t he Member St at es and of  t he Union, 11646/10, 7 July 2010, Brussels 
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The Europe 2020 strategy has received a mixed reaction in the consultation exercise and 
subsequent debates and media commentary. In the academic community, a prominent 
series of contributions have emphasised four key positive features in comparison to the 
Lisbon strategy.9  
x it provides a more comprehensive strategy with a clearer focus on the 
environmental (sustainable) and social (inclusive) dimensions of growth, as well as 
recognising the need for a stronger industrial policy; 
x there is greater concentration and focus in the approach to target-setting; 
x the improved and more coherent economic coordination between national 
budgetary policies and growth-enhancing policies is welcomed; and 
x the use of specific country reports and recommendations should make poor 
performance more visible.  
On the negative side, critics have argued that there has been a lack of informed assessment 
or evaluation of the preceding Lisbon strategy, particularly the reasons for non-
achievement of the goals. There are also concerns that some mistakes may be replicated. 
For example, the strategy does not entail substantial innovation in terms of instruments 
and is arguably a window-dressing exercise, consisting of indicators where EU has limited 
power to add value.  The targets are regarded as over-ambitious, especially given the 
challenging budgetary climate. Further, it fails to incorporate the impact of the short-term 
imperative of crisis exit strategies on the medium-term goals of the strategy and even 
contains contradictions, such as the limited priority given to financial regulation or a 
narrow interpretation of inequalities. Problems of coherence have also been cited: there 
has been inadequate reflection on the tensions and contradictions between different aims 
or within flagship initiatives, such as social cohesion versus growth or between employment 
flexibility and security. Lastly, several problems with the governance approach have been 
noted, particularly: the limited consultation on the document or space for involvement of 
stakeholders in implementation; the enhanced role of ECOFIN (Finance Ministers) at the 
expense of other sectoral Councils; and the lack of attention to how learning and genuine 
and effective scrutiny by peers can be stimulated. 
 
                                                 
9 See the contributions by Annnete Bogardt and Francisco Torres, Phillipe Pochet, Iain Begg, Laszlo 
Csaba, Karel Lannoo, Luc Soete and Christian Egenhofer in: Int ereconomics (2010) Forum on Europe 
2020  A promising strategy?, Volume 45, Number 3, May/June 2010, pp136-70. 
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3. THE STATE-OF-PLAY ON EU BUDGET REFORM 
3.1 EU developments 
The EU budgetary review process was launched by the Commission in September 2007 with 
a consultation paper,10 stating that: “ This budget  review is unique, a once in a generat ion 
opport unit y t o make a reform of  t he budget  and in t he way we work” . The consultation 
was concluded as far back as late 2008 with the assertion that radical reform is necessary. 
A refocusing of spending on future challenges was considered necessary to shift the centre 
of gravity of the budget towards the priorities of competitiveness, environment and energy. 
A fair and transparent mechanism of contributions was also seen as important, replacing 
the current web of corrections. Flexibility was advocated, so that the budget has 
improved capacity to respond to evolving challenges. 
Since the conclusion of the consultation, the Commission has made little public statement 
on the future of the EU budget. However, in November 2009, a leaked draft of a DG Budget 
Communication gave some insight into the way that the Commission might be thinking.  
The paper proposed that EU spending should be focused on three key axes: sustainable 
growth and jobs  research, skills, convergence, innovation; climate and energy  energy 
efficiency, mitigation and adaptation; and global Europe  poverty, migration 
management, neighbourhood cooperation. A stable budget of one percent of GNI was 
foreseen. The paper advocated a reform of EU financing, with the replacement of VAT by a 
new own resource and the phasing-out of all correction mechanisms (over time).  Better 
delivery was envisaged through simplified procedures (including the delegation of financial 
control to Member States, more use of performance incentives such as conditionalities, and 
the differentiation of management/control requirements based on capacity.  
With respect to Cohesion policy, the leaked paper recommended a concentration of 
resources on nat ional  convergence, and regional disparities within countries. It questioned 
the of value of Regional Competitiveness & Employment (RCE) funding and mooted a 
possible redirection of RCE funding to areas like research, innovation and TENS as well as  
strengthened focus on cross-border cooperation. The possibility of extending the use of 
adjustment instruments in response to external shocks  economic crises, natural disasters, 
terrorism, public health emergencies - was discussed. Thematic concentration on a limited 
number of priorities was foreseen: human capital development; infrastructure connections 
between lagging areas and growth centres; climate and biodiversity investments (climate 
proofing); and research and innovation. Lastly, the paper made several proposals for 
improving delivery, potentially including a separation of the European Social Fund from the 
European Regional Development Fund, the creation of a Single Strategic Framework for all 
Community funds under shared management (Cohesion, rural development, maritime), and 
more support for institutional capacity  through know-how exchange and networks. 
                                                 
10 European Commission (2007) Reforming t he Budget , Changing Europe: A Publ ic Consul t at ion Paper 
in View of  t he 2008/ 2009 Budget  Review, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, SEC(2007) 
1188, 12.9.2007 
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The DG Budget non-paper attracted significant criticisms, especially from regional 
development institutional interests such as the European parliaments REGI Committee, the 
Conference of Peripheral & Maritime Regions, the Assembly of European Regions and other 
networks. The main objections were that the DG Budget proposals represented a de facto 
renationalisation of Cohesion policy; it would involve a downgrading of multi-level 
governance, with no recognition of regional and local issues/interests or involvement, and 
the downgrading of Objective 2 would potentially exclude c.200 regions from the policy. 
The separation of ESF from Cohesion policy was also seen as counterproductive. In response 
to such criticisms, President Barroso rapidly disassociated himself from the paper.  
Since then, the publication of the official Communication has been repeatedly delayed  
first from Spring 2010 to the Summer, then to early Autumn and now to October.  Reports 
suggest that the scope for radical reform has diminished, largely because of the political 
turbulence caused by the economic crisis. Of course, there is always a bias towards the 
status quo in EU budgetary negotiations given that budget agreements require unanimity, 
and the current fiscal constraints in major EU economies limit the scope for more spending. 
Nevertheless, in the context of the ambitious Europe 2020 proposals, the budget review will 
play an important role in charting the priorities for future EU spending which will be 
formally put proposed by the Commission in July 2011. 
Meanwhile, the process of preparing positions on the EU budget by other EU institutions has 
advanced over the past year. In the European Parliament, a new committee was set up for 
this purpose in July 2010. Named the Special Committee on the Policy Challenges and 
Budgetary Resources for a Sustainable European Union after 2013 (SURE), the committees 
mandate includes six key tasks: 
x to define Parliament's priorities for the EU's next long-term budget framework, in 
both political and budgetary terms; 
x to estimate how much money the EU will need to achieve its objectives; 
x to define the duration of the next long-term budget framework (this has traditionally 
been seven years but MEPs want to adjust it to match the mandates of the 
Parliament and the Commission); 
x to propose a structure for future long-term budget frameworks; 
x to draw up guidelines on  how  resources should be distributed within and between 
different parts (headings) of the EU budget; and 
x to specify the link between a reform of the EU's financing system and a review of 
expenditure, so as to provide the Budgets Committee with a basis for the forthcoming 
MFF negotiations. 
A first meeting took place in July 2010 to elect the committees chair (Jutta Haug,  S&D, 
Germany)  rapporteur (Salvador Garriga Polledo, EPP, Spain)  and four vice chairs (Anne 
Jensen, ALDE, Denmark; Jan Olbrycht, EPP, Poland; Konrad Szymaĝski ECR, Poland; and 
Helga Trüpel, Greens/EFA, Germany).  Working meetings began in September, but draft 
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reports are not anticipated till 2011. Looking at specific areas of expenditure, however, an 
indication of the Parliaments future stance on the agriculture heading can be seen from a 
resolution on the future of the CAP, approved at a plenary sitting on 9 July 2010. On the 
basis of an own-initiative report by the agriculture committee, the resolution essentially 
defends the current approach, arguing for continuity rather than change: maintaining the 
current share of the EU budget and co-financing approach; and continuing with some 
market measures as a safety net, the Single Farm and the Less-Favoured Area Payments, 
and flexible spending entitlements that are fully community-financed.  
The Committee of the Regions preparatory work has also stepped up a gear. A formal 
opinion on the future EU budget is imminent. Among the key expected proposals are that a 
10 year financial framework (that is, 5+5 approach) be adopted and for there to be 
flexibility to reallocate up to 25 percent of the budget after five years. 11  Like the 
Parliament, the Committee of the Regions has also issued an opinion the future of the CAP 
with a supportive stance on the level of EU expenditure. Specifically, it calls for a 
consolidated and reinforced budget that is up to the challenges and issues to be 
addressed.12 
3.2 National developments 
The development of Member State thinking on the post-2014 financial perspectives was 
prompted by the EU budgetary review. Virtually all of the Member States provided formal 
responses to the consultation, concluded with a major conference in Brussels in November 
2008. Beyond these contributions, there have been very few additional formal government 
statements or position papers on budgetary reform published. However, internal 
consultation and coordination processes have advanced and many Member States expect to 
develop clearer negotiating mandates in response to the Commissions forthcoming budget 
paper.  
3.2.1 Organisational preparat ions 
The process of developing a national position on EU budget reform is often led by a Finance 
or Treasury Ministry with varying degrees of input from other Ministries (particularly those 
responsible for managing EU funding) through existing inter-ministerial coordination forums 
and channels (e.g. Finland, Ireland, Netherlands).  
x For instance, in Finland discussions have progressed within the Budget 
Departments EU Unit at the Ministry of Finance. Politically contentious issues are 
resolved in the so-called Agenda Leader Group (which gathers representatives at 
                                                 
11 Committee of the Regions press Release (2010) EU budget review: regions will continue to play key 
role, agree Bresso and Lewandowski, 19 July 2010, Committee of the Regions, Brussels: 
http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/PresentationTemplate.aspx?view=detail&id=dcd3c76f-7729-4edd-
a884-50a36982ff1b 
12  Committee of the Regions (2010) Own-Initiative Opinion, The Future Of The Cap After 2013: 
http://coropinions.cor.europa.eu/CORopinionDocument.aspx?identifier=cdr\nat-v\dossiers\nat-v-
003\cdr127-2010_fin_ac.doc&language=EN 
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the level of heads of departments) and final decisions will be formalised in the EU 
Ministerial Committee.  
In other cases, a Foreign Affairs or External Relations Ministry plays a more significant role 
in coordinating the process, given their general responsibility for EU policy coordination.  
x In Italy, the lead is taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which prepared the 
national contribution to the budget review consultation and has begun developing 
this work further through inter-ministerial meetings in late March 2010 with 
representatives from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department for Community 
Policies and the Department for Development Policies.  
x In Poland, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is taking the lead on the formulation of 
the government position, now that the Office for European Integration (which led 
the role for the previous financial perspective) has been incorporated into the 
Ministry. 
x In Spain, the DG for Integration and Coordination of General and Economic Affairs 
of the State Secretariat for European Affairs (Ministry of External Cooperation) 
coordinates the governments EU budget reform position in cooperation with 
officials and technical experts from other Ministries (particularly the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture) which have been meeting in 
an Inter-Ministerial Committee for EU Affairs or engaging in informal contacts.  
Greater political oversight is evident in other countries, sometimes involving direct links to 
heads of state.  
x In Austria, the process is led by the Treasury, but the work is closely coordinated 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Chancellery  
x In France, the process is managed by the President and the Prime Minister together 
with the Budget Directorate of the Budget Ministry and the General Secretariat for 
European Affairs which is directly affiliated to the Prime Minister.  
The setting up of dedicated committees or working groups on specific aspects of budgetary 
reform is indicative of the increasing attention being devoted to the development of more 
detailed positions on the post-2013 financial perspectives.  
x In Italy, a working group was set up in mid-2010 to assess the implications of the 
budgetary review for net balances in more detail.  
x Similarly, the recent preparatory work in France has focused on modelling the main 
scenarios for the different budget headings, involving dedicated meetings between 
the Ministry of Agriculture and DATAR.  
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x In the case of Ireland, a high-level consultative committee on CAP reform has been 
set up by the Department of Agriculture and submissions on CAP reform from the 
public and interest organisations have been invited.   
x The forthcoming EU Presidency in Poland is seen as an important milestone for 
Polish authorities in the budget debate and working groups on Cohesion policy have 
been set up to prepare for this in the Ministry of Regional Development  
Parliamentary input to the budgetary review process is another distinctive feature of recent 
developments in some countries.  
x On the request of the Prime Minister, a report on budgetary reform was 
produced by the French Parliaments European Affairs Committee in May 2010 
to steer strategic thinking, based on a broad consultation process with a broad 
array of stakeholders at different levels.13  
x A similar process is underway in Spain through the creation of a temporary 
parliamentary committee in March 2010 to examine the reform of the EU 
budget along with the implications for the CAP and Cohesion policy. 
As noted, most Member States have not issued further formal position papers beyond the 
budgetary review consultation responses and it is evident that the intention in many cases 
is to wait-and-see what the Commission will propose in its budget paper before reacting. 
In line with this timetable, an official French position is expected in November 2010, 
following intensive work after the summer break, and an Italian memorandum on the EU 
budget and Cohesion policy is expected soon. In other cases, responses to EU policy 
developments will only be undertaken if this proves necessary (e.g. Germany, Spain). 
Political attention has been diverted to more pressing domestic matters elsewhere. Linked 
to managing the banking crisis and public sector staff cuts, Irelands Department of Finance 
is under considerable pressure and the position on the EU budget has not advanced to any 
great extent since the budgetary review.  
3.2.2 Budget posit ions 
Turning to the substantive content of EU budgetary reform, initial Member State views have 
been systematically reviewed elsewhere on the basis of the consultation responses.14 These 
positions have not changed significantly since then, and very few new ideas have been 
proposed. According to the national policymakers interviewed, the main issues that have 
                                                 
13 Lequiller P (2010) Rapport  de Pierre Lequil ler, auprès de Monsieur Michel Mercier, Ministre de 
lespace rural et de laménagement du territoire et de Monsieur Pierre Lellouche, Secrétaire dEtat 
chargé des affaires européennes.  
14 Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2008) Ideas for Budget and Policy Reform: Reviewing the 
Debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+, EoRPA Paper 08/4, European Regional Policy Research Consortium, 
EPRC, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow; Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2009) Challenges, 
Consultations and Concepts: Preparing for the Cohesion Policy Debate, EoRPA Paper 09/6, European 
Regional Policy Research Consortium, EPRC, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.   
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dominated internal discussions relate to the size of the EU budget, the added value of 
expenditure and future policy priorities.  
Opposing views on the size of the EU budget  were already evident in the budget 
consultation responses. On the one hand, Greece, Poland and Portugal emphasised the need 
for the EU budget to have sufficient resources, warning (in the case of the Polish 
submission) that budget reductions will reduce responsiveness to changing needs. On the 
other side, some of the net contributors called for a leaner budget with substantial 
reprioritisation of expenditure (Sweden and the UK) while Austria and the Netherlands 
explicitly called for total spending to remain constant at a level of 1 percentage of EU GNI, 
the capping level which had been defended by the group of six net budget contributors in 
the previous financial perspective.  
Since the budget consultation, Germany has adopted a similar stance by calling for a 1 
percent ceiling on the EU budget in the federal governments coalition agreement of 
October 2009. 15  The French contribution to the budget consultation was silent on the 
question of scale, but interviews with government officials suggest that the ambition is to 
keep the budget within the current limits, a view which is also reflected in the French 
Parliaments report on the future of the budget. This states that, as a net contributor to 
the EU budget, France is probably prompted, in a context of generalised pressure on public 
finances of Member States, not to support a significant increase of the EU budget as 
compared to its current level.16 Following a meeting between the French Budget Minister 
Francois Baroin and the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble on 24 August 2010, 
Commission proposals for budgetary increases in 2011 (including future proposals for a new 
EU-wide tax that could fall on bank transactions or air travel17) were strongly criticised by 
the Ministers for being out of line with the austerity measures being implemented across EU 
Member States in the challenging fiscal climate.18  
This economic realism is echoed by recent Ministerial statements in Spain, a country which 
is likely to become a net contributor for the first time and faces a drastic squeeze on public 
finances. In a Parliamentary hearing on budget reform,19 the Secretary of State for Finance 
and Budgets noted that the government will continue to advocate a strong Europe and a 
strong budget as in the past, but also acknowledged that it is unlikely that the budget will 
increase given the current financial context. Tensions about the increasing net payer 
burden in Finland have been at the core of a recent informal document produced by the 
                                                 
15 CDU, CSU and FDP (2009) Growth. Education. Unity, The Coalition Agreement between the CDU, 
CSU and FDP for the 17th legislative period, p165. 
16 Ibid, p.41 
17 Pignal S (2010) Brussels proposes eurotaxes to fund EU, Financial  Times, August 9 2010, London. 
18  Euractiv.com (2010) France, Germany at odds with Brussels over budget, 25 August 2010: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/france-germany-odds-brussels-over-budget-news-497151 
19 Commision Mixta para la Unión Europea (2010) Comparecencias del señor Secretario de Estado de 
Hacienda y Presupuestos para informar en relación con la materia objeto de estudio de la ponencia 
sobre el marco presupuestario de la Unión Europea 2013-2020 y su impacto sobre la reforma de la 
política agraria común y sobre las políticas de cohesión.   Sesión Núm. 39, 25 de Mayo 2010, Palacio 
del Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid. 
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government, concerns which seem to be shared in Italy given the increased attention being 
placed on the modelling of future scenarios.  
An even harder stance has been adopted by the new UK Prime Minister David Cameron who 
has called for the budget to be reduced over time in the context of recent debates about 
the annual budget for 2011. In a joint press conference with Danish Prime Minister Lars 
Lokke Rasmussen in August 2010, Cameron stated that “ as we reduce our def icit s at  home, 
I t hink it ’ s very import ant , as we were discussing, t hat  we both argue t o make sure t hat  
t he European budget  over t ime is reduced rat her t han increased.20  
With respect to expenditure, one of the main conclusions from the consultation was the 
universal support among Member States for decisions on future EU policies to be based on 
their European added value, although interpretations of what this meant in practice varied 
or were simply not provided. Linkages to the new Europe 2020 strategy are increasingly 
being used as a justification in this respect.  
x In Finland, a recent government paper advocates a more modern approach 
entailing, for instance, activities which would result in more added value, and a 
better linkage to the components proposed in Europe 2020, particularly 
competitiveness, R&D and innovation dimensions.  
x The German governments coalition agreement of October 2009 expresses its 
commitment to the Lisbon Treaty objective of transforming the EU into the worlds 
most competitive economic area and states that EU expenditure must be seen in 
this context including more resources from the Structural Funds being dedicated to 
this objective.21  
The ramifications of Europe 2020 for existing EU policy priorities are a cause for concern in 
some countries.  
x An updated Polish position paper on Cohesion policy defends the policys central 
contribution to Europe 2020 objectives and argues that it should therefore “ keep it s 
prominent  place in t he EU budget .22 This was reiterated by the Polish President, 
Bronislaw Komorowski, who argued for maintaining Cohesion policy funding: it is 
so important to make solidarity real, to make development levels more equal."23 
                                                 
20 Transcript of a press conference given by Prime Minister David Cameron and the Danish Prime 
Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen in London, on 12 August 2010: 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/08/press-conference-with-the-
danish-prime-minister-54498 
21 Ibid, p.165 
22 Position of the Government of the Republic of Poland on the future of Cohesion Policy after 2013 
Cohesion Policy as an efficient, effective and territorially differentiated response to EU development 
challenges Adopted by the Council of Ministers on 18th August 2010 
23 Grajewski M (2010) Polish leader urges EU to keep generous aid funds, Reut ers, 1 September 2010. 
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x Recent government speeches in Spain have emphasised that Europe 2020 strategy 
should not lead to a reduction in spending on traditional policies (both the CAP and 
Cohesion policy), but that quality should be the core principle informing future 
spending grounded on the added value and complementarity generated for the 
EU and for individual Member States.24 Four elements are emphasised:  
o the ability to contribute to common EU objectives, notably competitiveness, 
economic, social and territorial cohesion and sustainable development;  
o positive externalities on energy supply and security, external security and the 
internal market;  
o the potential to encourage greater Member States participation in EU policies 
and especially those which contribute to convergence, competitiveness and 
sustainability;  
o and multiplier effects on domestic investments and synergies with resources 
mobilized at the level of Member States.   
Diverging views on the appropriate level of funding for the core areas of agricultural and 
cohesion expenditure were evident from the budget review consultation. On the Common 
Agricultural Policy, two opposing camps can be identified. 
On the one hand, there are countries that want to see the retention of a strong CAP, like 
France and Greece. Recent statements by ministers and senior officials in Spain indicate 
that they share this position, 25  and bilateral talks with Poland suggest that there is 
consensus with Spain on CAP reform. 26  Concerns about the future of the single farm 
payment are particularly salient in Ireland, where a high-level consultative committee on 
CAP reform has recently been set up.  
By contrast, a drastic reduction in the CAP budget was proposed by the UK and Denmark, 
including a reprioritisation towards rural development and the provision of public goods. 
The UK line was reiterated during the new coalition governments first ministerial visit to 
Brussels in May 2010, where the UK Minister for Agriculture and Environment suggested that 
the financial crisis should help to focus Member States minds on the need for radical reform 
and could increase the number of British allies.27 
The debate on the CAP has intensified over the past year. A large public consultation on the 
future of the CAP concluded with a conference on 19-20 July 2010, where the Agriculture 
                                                 
24 Commision Mixta para la Unión Europea (2010) op.cit . 
25 Miniserio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino (2010) Elena Espinosa defiende la fortaleza 
para la PAC post 2013 por el carácter estratégico de la agricultura europea, Gabinete de Prensa, 10 
June 2010, Madrid. 
26  Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2010) Polish-Spanish talks, Press Release, 
14.05.2010, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Warsaw. 
27 European Voice (2010) UK hopes for CAP reform support, 17 May 2010, European Voice, Brussels. 
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Commissioner recognised that the policy needed to change. CAP payments based on historic 
production levels needed to be replaced by a more equitable method of payments. Both the 
consultation and conference argued in support for CAP to be providing modern public goods, 
to be supporting high nature value farming and to be adapted to different territorial 
needs and conditions.28 
At the most recent informal meeting of agriculture ministers (September 2010), the 
background working paper argued the need for a strong CAP on the basis that a common 
agricultural policy at European level was regarded as preferable to Member State policies.29 
Further, there was a desire to keep rural development support separate from Structural 
Funds: “ t here is a general  view t hat  t he t wo pil lars of  t he CAP should be maint ained and 
t hat  t he rural  development  fund should not  be merged wit h t he cohesion funds. However, 
t he relat ionship bet ween t he t wo pil lars should be clarif ied and t heir coherence and 
coordinat ion should be st rengt hened bearing in mind t he need for bet t er coherence and 
coordinat ion wit h ot her EU pol icies” . This was supported by a joint Franc-German position 
paper issued in advance of the informal meeting which supported the current two pillar 
structure and opposed national co-financing within Pillar 1.30  
In the area of Cohesion policy, Member States views on the appropriate level of funding for 
Cohesion policy are equally divided. The Dutch consultation submission explicitly called for 
cuts in spending, while Sweden and the UK argued for a reprioritisation of spending towards 
other policies. By contrast, most of the EU12 responses expressed resistance to cuts arguing 
that cohesion remains a fundamental and overarching objective for the Union. Italy and 
Spain also support an adequately resourced Cohesion policy, notwithstanding their net 
payer status. Decisions on the overall scale of funding for Cohesion policy are closely 
connected to several inter-related issues concerning eligibility and the policy architecture 
of Objectives.  
On eligibility, the question is whether there should be a concentration of funding on 
poorer Member States and/or regions, as argued in the consultation submissions by 
Estonia, Sweden, UK, Czech Republic and Romania, or an all-region approach, as 
emphasised by the submissions of Finland, France and Germany. The (former) UK 
governments position was reiterated recently: 31  “ Where Member Stat es have t he 
inst it ut ional  st ruct ures and f inancial  st rength t o develop and pursue t heir own pol icies, 
t hey should be enabled t o do so wit hin a common EU st rategic f ramework. Consequent ly 
St ruct ural  Funds in t he richer Member St at es should be phased out .”  
                                                 
28
 Publ ic goods cent re st age at  t he CAP post  2013 Conference, Institute for European Environmental 
Policy, News briefing on the future of the CAP, IEEP, London, 30 July 2010. 
29 European Council (2010) Choosing t oday for a st ronger CAP t omorrow, Informal meeting of the 
Ministers of Agriculture, La Hulpe, Belgium, 19-21 September 2010, Council of the European union, 
Brussels, 13452/10. 
30  Franco-German Posit ion on Fut ure of  t he CAP Released, Institute for European Environmental 
Policy, News briefing on the future of the CAP, IEEP, London, 23 September 2010. 
31 Department of Works and Pensions (2010) Memorandum t o t he House of  Lords European Union 
Commit t ee, Making it  work: t he European Social  Fund, Minutes of Evidence, 2 February 2010, House 
of Lords, London. 
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On the other hand, interviews with national policy-makers across the EU suggest that there 
is strong support for the current regional approach, concentrating on the Convergence 
objective on the basis of the well-established threshold of 75 percent of EU GDP per 
capita. It appears that Finland is relatively isolated in arguing for supplementary criteria to 
be used to determine funding allocations (e.g. on demographic change).  
Increasing consensus is evident in relation to the idea of modulating Convergence funding 
for transition regions immediately above the 75 percent threshold. While some policy-
makers disagree with this informally, the latest Council conclusions on Cohesion policy 
recall the “ experiences f rom t he appl ied t ransit ional  regimes and notes t hat  possible 
discussion should consider exist ing t ransit ional regimes, int er al ia in order t o seek similar 
t reat ment  of  regions in similar sit uat ions, which also al low programmes to be organised 
ef fect ively.” 32 Germany, Greece and Spain are particularly keen on transitional support 
given the major funding cuts anticipated from the loss of Convergence status for several 
regions (see Section 4), a view which is supported by Poland in its updated position paper 
on Cohesion policy33 as well the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions.34 
A proposal that has been floated in EU circles is that there should be sliding zones in the 
range 75-90 percent of EU GDP per capita, with a sliding scale of support. On the other 
hand, this could lead to an expansion of the Cohesion policy budget, which would conflict 
with net payer countries budgetary concerns.  
The future of the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective is less certain, not 
least given the ongoing criticism about its added value and the related calls for a national 
approach to eligibility. However, the indications are that a significant number of countries 
would resist the renationalisation of the Objective. France has advocated an EU-wide 
approach for all regions, reiterated in the earlier-cited parliamentary report on budgetary, 
policy and diplomatic grounds: from a budgetary perspective, it is the funding tranche with 
the greatest rate of return for France; politically and policy-wise, it is considered important 
to maintain a sizeable contribution of Structural Funds to the development strategies of all 
French regions as a withdrawal might lead to questions over the future of the State-region 
contracts; and, diplomatically, it is considered necessary to be in line with the majority 
view of the Member States, notably Germany, as well as the European Parliament. National 
policy-makers from other member States have also defended the objective (e.g. Finland, 
Italy, Poland), although recognising that cuts may be necessary (Germany) or that more 
thought needs to be given to how the Objective can generate positive incentives effects or 
spillover effects on Convergence regions (Spain). A proposal raised in a Council Presidency 
                                                 
32 Council of the European Union (2010) Council  conclusions on t he St rat egic Report  of  2010 by t he 
Commission on t he Implement at ion of  t he Cohesion Pol icy Programmes,  3023rd Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting, 14 June 2010, Luxembourg. 
33 Position of the Government of the Republic of Poland on the future of Cohesion Policy after 2013 
“ Cohesion Pol icy as an ef f icient , ef fect ive and t errit orial ly dif ferent iat ed response t o EU 
development  chal lenges”  Adopted by the Council of Ministers on 18th August 2010 
34 Report  on Green Paper on Territ orial  Cohesion and t he st at e for t he debate on t he fut ure reform 
of  Cohesion pol icy, A6-0083/2009, 20.2.2009; Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Fifth 
progress report on economic and social cohesion C 76, 31.3.2009, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Luxembourg. 
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paper for the informal meeting of regional policy ministers in February 2010 is the 
introduction of tranches within the Objective to reflect the significant differences in 
development across the competitiveness regions by allowing differentiation in the 
allocation of resources within the objective and the eligible investments.35  
Finally, the continuation of the European Territorial Cooperation Objective has universal 
support across the Member States. The above-cited Presidency paper suggests that there is 
sufficient consensus across the Member States for the Objective to be financially 
reinforced, but only if agreement can be reached on clearly defined financial allocation 
criteria - between Member States and cooperation zones, and between different fields or 
levels of territorial cooperation (cross-border, transnational and interregional).36  
                                                 
35 Spanish Council Presidency (2010) Orient at ion document  for t he debate on t he fut ure of  Cohesion 
Pol icy, Informal Meeting of Ministers of Regional Policy, February 19th 2010, Zaragoza.  
36 Ibid, p5 
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4. COHESION POLICY SCENARIOS 2014+: 
ELIGIBILITY AND ALLOCATIONS 
A critical factor influencing Member State positions on these budgetary questions and the 
architecture of Cohesion policy post-2014 is the issue of future eligibility, which determines 
the funding that will flow to different countries and regions. This section explores future 
eligibility and allocation scenarios under EU Cohesion Policy on the basis of the latest 
statistical data.37 The starting point for the analysis is essentially a reapplication of the 
methods used for 2007-13. The latest GDP data covers the period up to and including 2007. 
The calculations use regional GDP data for 2005-7 and GNI data for 2006-8.Other things 
being equal, Cohesion policy post-2014 will be based on GDP data for 2007-9 and GNI data 
for 2008-10. 
4.1 2007-13 Criteria and coverage 
Cohesion policy distinguishes between eligibility for the Cohesion Fund, which is 
determined at the national level, and eligibility for the various strands of policy determined 
at the regional level. Eligibility for the Cohesion Fund is restricted to Member States where 
gross national income (GNI) per head measured in PPS is less than 90 percent of the EU 25 
average for the period 2001-3 (see Table 1). Current recipients of the Cohesion Fund are 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. Ireland ceased to be eligible at the end of 2003, following a 
mid-term review. Spain successfully made a case that special arrangements should apply to 
Member States subject to the statistical effect of enlargement on the threshold for the 
Cohesion Fund and benefits from a special allocation. 
Table 1: Member States eligible for the Cohesion Fund 2007-13 
Eligible  GNI(PPS) per head 
EU25=100 
 Ineligible  GNI(PPS) per head 
EU25=100 
Latvia 39.5  Germany  108.7 
Lithuania 42.4  Italy 108.7 
Estonia 44.4  Ireland 110.8 
Poland 45.5  Finland 113.6 
Slovak Rep 51.1  France 114.0 
Hungary 55.7  Sweden 115.6 
Czech Rep 64.9  UK 119.6 
Malta 73.5  Belgium 120.2 
Portugal 75.2  Austria 121.1 
Slovenia 75.7  Netherlands 121.5 
Greece 77.9  Denmark 122.9 
Cyprus 82.5  Luxembourg 195.3 
Spain 94.1    
Note: (i) Although Spain is over the qualifying threshold, it is eligible for special transitional 
arrangements under the Cohesion Fund; (ii) Bulgaria and Romania also qualified for the Cohesion 
Fund; (iii) Based on 2001-3 data. 
Source: Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013, Fiche No. 57 rev 2. 
                                                 
37 The calculations and assessment in this section were sent to EoRPA partners in Spring 2010 soon 
after the latest Eurostat data were published. 
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Current eligibility for the regionally-based elements of Cohesion policy is illustrated in 
Figure 2. As is well-known, four categories of assisted area can be distinguished: 
x Convergence: those regions where GDP(PPS) per head for 2000-2 was less than 75 
percent of the EU25 average. 
x Phasing-out: those regions squeezed out of eligibility for Convergence status as a 
consequence of enlargement, these being regions where GDP(PPS) per head was 
between 75 percent of the EU15 average and 75 percent of the EU25 average. 
x Phasing-in: former Objective 1 regions which had outgrown even Phasing-out region 
status. 
x Regional competitiveness and employment: the remaining territory of the EU. 
It is important to note that while Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007, 
the averages used for 2007-13 were for EU25, not EU27. 
 
Figure 2: Structural Funds eligibility 2007-13 
Structural Funds 2007-13
GDP 2000-2
Convergence   (80)
Phasing-out   (16)
Phasing-in   (13)
RCE   (153)
 
Source: Own elaboration after DG Regio. 
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 As Table 2 shows, Convergence regions are heavily concentrated in central and eastern 
Europe and the Baltic states, covering the entire territories of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, as well as most of Hungary and the Czech 
and Slovak Republics (the capital city regions of these countries being excluded). Most of 
Portugal is also covered (Lisbon region excluded) together with around one-third of Italy, 
Greece and Spain, most of eastern Germany, and small parts of the UK.  
Overall, the EU15 account for just over one-third of total convergence coverage. However, 
around half of the EU27 total is within three countries  Italy, Poland and Romania. 
Coverage of Phasing-out regions is not significant at the EU27 level, covering just 3.4 
percent of the EU population. Moreover, Phasing-out only concerns eight countries  all 
within the EU15 (see Table 3). Nevertheless, coverage is particularly significant in Greece, 
where over half the population falls into this category. Germany, Greece and Spain 
together account for over 80 percent of Phasing-out coverage. 
 
Table 2: Convergence region coverage 2007-13 
 Population % of population Share of population 
EU27 153721.2 31.7 100.0 
EU25  124049.2 27.3 80.7 
EU15  55095.2 14.5 35.8 
Bulgaria 7868.9 100.0 5.1 
Czech Republic 9042.0 88.6 5.9 
Germany  10327.8 12.5 6.7 
Estonia 1361.2 100.0 0.9 
Greece 4026.3 36.6 2.6 
Spain 12882.8 31.8 8.4 
France 1748.9 2.9 1.1 
Italy 16712.3 29.2 10.9 
Latvia 2338.6 100.0 1.5 
Lithuania 3469.0 100.0 2.3 
Hungary 7331.7 72.2 4.8 
Malta 395.9 100.0 0.3 
Poland 38230.0 100.0 24.9 
Portugal 7032.2 67.8 4.6 
Romania 21803.1 100.0 14.2 
Slovenia 1995.0 100.0 1.3 
Slovak Republic 4790.6 88.9 3.1 
United Kingdom 2364.9 4.0 1.5 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
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Table 3: Phasing-out region coverage, 2007-13 
 Eligible regions Population % of population Share of population 
EU27  16395.4 3.4 100.0 
EU25   16395.4 3.6 100.0 
EU15   16395.4 4.3 100.0 
Belgium Hainaut 1281.0 12.4 7.8 
Germany  
Brandenburg-Südwest 
Lüneberg 
Leipzig 
Halle 
5030.4 6.1 30.7 
Greece 
Kentriki Makedonia 
Dytiki Makedonia 
Attiki 
6100.1 55.5 37.2 
Spain 
Asturias 
Murcia 
Ceuta 
Melilla 
2346.2 5.8 14.3 
Italy Basilicata 597.1 1.0 3.6 
Austria Burgenland 278.3 3.4 1.7 
Portugal Algarve 394.6 3.8 2.4 
UK Highlands & Islands 367.6 0.6 2.2 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data 
Coverage of Phasing-in regions is also modest at the EU27 level, covering just 3.9 percent 
of the population (see Table 4). However, coverage is particularly significant in Cyprus 
(where the whole country is eligible), Hungary, Ireland and Spain. Spain alone accounts for 
approaching half of the total Phasing-in population. 
Table 4: Phasing-in region coverage, 2007-13 
 Eligible regions Population % of population Share of population 
EU27  19000.3 3.9 100.0 
EU25   19000.3 4.2 100.0 
EU15   15458.3 4.1 81.4 
Greece Sterea Ellada 
Notio Aigaio 
861.1 7.8 4.5 
Spain 
Castilla y León 
Valencia 
Canarias 
8376.6 20.7 44.1 
Ireland Border, Midlands, West 1040.6 26.5 5.5 
Italy Sardegna 1634.2 2.9 8.6 
Cyprus Entire country 715.1 100.0 3.8 
Hungary Közép-Magyarország 2826.9 27.8 14.9 
Portugal Madeira 240.8 2.3 1.3 
Finland Itä-Suomi 674.5 13.0 3.6 
UK Merseyside 
South Yorkshire 
2630.4 4.4 13.8 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data 
The Regional Competitiveness & Employment (RCE) strand covers all regions that do not 
have Convergence, Phasing-out or Phasing-in status. This covers over 60 percent of the EU 
population, but is heavily concentrated in the EU15  notably Germany, France and the UK, 
which together account for over 60 percent of the RCE population.  
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Table 5: RCE region coverage, 2007-13 
 Population % of population Share of population 
EU27 295255.3 60.9 100.0 
EU25  295255.3 64.9 100.0 
EU15  293496.1 77.1 99.4 
Belgium 9049.0 87.6 3.1 
Czech Republic 1158.8 11.4 0.4 
Denmark 5376.0 100.0 1.8 
Germany  67123.7 81.4 22.7 
Spain 16940.7 41.8 5.7 
France 59487.8 97.1 20.1 
Ireland 2885.6 73.5 1.0 
Italy 38213.4 66.9 12.9 
Luxembourg 446.2 100.0 0.2 
Netherlands 16147.0 100.0 5.5 
Austria 7805.5 96.6 2.6 
Portugal 2700.7 26.0 0.9 
Slovak Republic 600.4 11.1 0.2 
Finland 4526.5 87.0 1.5 
Sweden 8925.0 100.0 3.0 
United Kingdom 53869.0 90.9 18.2 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
 
4.2 Post 2014 Criteria and coverage? 
To date, no firm indications have been given about future eligibility criteria for the 
Structural Funds. Nevertheless, the definition of eligibility for the Cohesion Fund and for 
Convergence regions, coupled with some transitional arrangements for regions losing 
Convergence region status has arguably become entrenched in Commission policy and, in 
the absence of information to the contrary, the discussion that follows proceeds on the 
basis that the existing system would be rolled forward. A key assumption in this discussion 
is that the benchmark for determining eligibility for the Cohesion Fund and Convergence 
status will be the EU27, rather than the EU25. Similarly, Phasing-out status relates to the 
impact of enlargement from EU25 to EU27, rather than from EU15 to EU25. 
Eligibility for the Cohesion Fund on the basis of 2006-8 GNI data is illustrated in Table 6. 
The main change in relation to the current position is that, in principle, Greece would 
cease to be eligible for the Cohesion Fund. However, even if this position were to remain 
unchanged on the basis of 2008-10 data (which itself seems doubtful), Greece would be 
certain to benefit from some transitional arrangements, precedents for which were set 
when Ireland and Spain ceased to qualify. The scale and nature of such arrangements 
would, as in the past, be the subject of negotiation. Nevertheless, it is notable that on the 
basis of current data, among the EU15 Member States, only Portugal would have full 
eligibility for the Cohesion Fund. 
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Table 6: Member States eligible for the Cohesion Fund 2014+? 
Eligible GNI(PPS) per head EU27=100   
GNI(PPS) per 
head EU27=100 
Bulgaria 37.2  Greece 91.7 
Romania 40.5  Italy 101.3 
Poland 52.7  Spain 102.8 
Latvia 53.9  France 110.0 
Lithuania 57.2  Finland 116.1 
Hungary 59.0  Germany 118.3 
Estonia 63.5  Belgium 119.8 
Slovakia 65.6  United Kingdom 120.8 
Portugal 73.4  Denmark 122.1 
Czech Republic 74.8  Austria 122.7 
Malta 74.9  Sweden 124.3 
Cyprus 86.1  Ireland 126.2 
Slovenia 88.1  Netherlands 132.7 
   Luxembourg 213.8 
Source: Own calculations from AMECO data. 
Coverage of eligible areas determined at the regional level is illustrated in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Structural Fund eligibility 2014+? 
Structural Funds 2014+?
GDP 2005-7
Convergence   (65)
Phasing-out   (8)
Phasing-in   (12)
RCE   (182)
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data.  
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Compared with Figure 2, Figure 3 shows a significant shift in coverage, with the scope of 
the Convergence and Phasing-out regions considerably reduced and higher coverage under 
Phasing-in and RCE status. It should be noted in passing that caution should be exercised in 
considering the number of eligible regions in the two maps  these are not directly 
comparable owing to changes in NUTS 2 boundaries in a number countries. 
Looking first at the coverage of Convergence regions, several key points emerge from the 
calculations based on the most recent data (see Table 7).  
At a global level, coverage would fall from 31.7 percent to 24.4 percent of the EU27 
population, with coverage concentrated in 15 rather than 18 Member States, as previously. 
Seven Member States would lose population coverage; two (Italy and Greece) would gain; 
the remainder would remain unchanged.  
x Poland and Romania would no longer have Convergence status in their entirety: the 
capital regions of Mazowieckie and BucureĂti-Ilfov would become Phasing-in regions 
x Germany would cease to have any Convergence regions, as would the United 
Kingdom 
x Spain would have only one such region (Extremadura) 
x Malta would lose Convergence status and become a Phasing-in region 
x Slovenia would partly be covered by Convergence status with coverage falling from 
100 percent to 54 percent following its split into two NUTS 2 regions 
x Greece and Italy would both increase coverage with Kentriki Makedonia and 
Basilicata both regaining Convergence status, having been Phasing-out regions in 
2007-13. 
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Table 7: Convergence region coverage, 2014+? 
 Population % of population Share of population 
EU27 121040.7 24.4 100.0 
EU25 94071.2 20.2 77.7 
EU15 31959.5 8.1 26.4 
Bulgaria 7659.8 100.0 6.3 
Czech Republic 9134.0 88.4 7.5 
Estonia 1341.7 100.0 1.1 
Greece 4791.3 42.8 4.0 
Spain 1076.7 2.4 0.9 
France 1463.3 2.3 1.2 
Italy 17491.4 29.5 14.5 
Latvia 2276.1 100.0 1.9 
Lithuania 3375.6 100.0 2.8 
Hungary 7170.9 71.3 5.9 
Poland 32940.6 86.4 27.2 
Portugal 7136.8 67.3 5.9 
Romania 19309.7 89.6 16.0 
Slovenia 1084.3 53.7 0.9 
Slovakia 4788.5 88.7 4.0 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
Phasing-out region status would concern regions which would have been eligible for 
Convergence status had it not been for enlargement from EU25 to EU27 and the consequent 
lowering of EU per capita GDP. The threshold for Phasing-out status on this basis is 77.95 of 
the EU27 average, which yields the coverage illustrated in Table 8. This shows that Phasing-
out coverage would be relatively marginal  fewer than 7 million population, compared with 
over 16 million in 2007-13. However, Phasing-out status would clearly be of considerable 
importance to Malta, since the whole country would be covered, even though, overall, the 
population concerned is concentrated in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and 
Greece. For the most part, the regions concerned have Convergence status in 2007-13; 
however, this is not the case for Hainaut, which also has Phasing-out status at present. 
Table 8: Phasing-out region coverage, 2014+? 
 Eligible regions Population % of population Share of population 
EU27  6887 1.4 100.0 
EU25  6887 1.5 100.0 
EU15  6478 1.6 94.1 
Belgium Hainaut 1297.5 12.2 18.8 
Germany  Brandenberg-
Nordost 
1150.7 1.4 16.7 
Greece Dytiki Makedonia 
Peloponissos 
887.9 7.9 12.9 
France Martinique 398.6 0.6 5.8 
Italy Molise 320.5 0.5 4.7 
Malta Entire country 409.1 100.0 5.9 
United Kingdom 
Cornwall & the 
Scilly Isles 
West Wales & the 
Valleys 
2422.8 4.0 35.2 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
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Phasing-in concerns regions with Convergence status in 2007-13, but which have outgrown 
even the Phasing-out threshold on the basis of the latest data. This concerns a population 
of some 30 million, compared with 19 million previously, although overall coverage at 6.1 
percent of the population is relatively modest. On the other hand, as Table 9 shows, these 
regions are heavily concentrated in a few countries  notably Germany and Spain - and 
cover significant proportions of those countries, except in the case of Greece. 
Table 9: Phasing-in region coverage, 2014+? 
 Eligible regions Population % of population Share of population 
EU27  30265.7 6.1 100.0 
EU25  28028.6 6.0 92.6 
EU15  22848.5 5.8 75.5 
Germany  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Chemnitz 
Dresden 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Thüringen 
9578.0 11.7 31.6 
Greece Kriti 605.4 5.4 2.0 
Spain Galicia 
Castilla-La Mancha 
Andalucía 
12665.1 28.2 41.8 
Poland Mazowieckie 5180.1 13.6 17.1 
Romania Bucaresti-Ilfov 2237.1 10.4 7.4 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
Table 10: RCE region coverage, 2014+? 
 Population % of population Share of population 
EU27 337377 68.1 100.0 
EU25 337377 72.3 100.0 
EU15 331899 84.4 98.4 
Belgium 9328 87.8 2.8 
Czech Republic 1200 11.6 0.4 
Denmark 5461 100.0 1.6 
Germany  71538 87.1 21.2 
Ireland 4357 100.0 1.3 
Greece 4908 43.9 1.5 
Spain 31137 69.4 9.2 
France 61963 97.1 18.4 
Italy 41563 70.0 12.3 
Cyprus 784 100.0 0.2 
Luxembourg  480 100.0 0.1 
Hungary 2885 28.7 0.9 
Netherlands 16382 100.0 4.9 
Austria 8316 100.0 2.5 
Portugal 3472 32.7 1.0 
Slovakia 609 11.3 0.2 
Finland 5289 100.0 1.6 
Sweden 9148 100.0 2.7 
United Kingdom 58558 96.0 17.4 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
Regional competitiveness and employment (RCE) is essentially a residual category for 
regions not qualifying under the Convergence or transitional headings. Reflecting changes 
under the other categories, the RCE population would increase from 60.9 percent to 68.1 
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percent of the EU27 population. It would remain heavily concentrated in EU15 (although 
somewhat less so than in 2007-13). Eight countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovenia) have no RCE regions. By contrast, seven countries are 
entirely covered by RCE status (see Table 10).  
One final issue is worth raising with respect to eligibility in the post-2014 period. It has 
been assumed here that transitional status in relation to EU15 averages has effectively run 
its course with further enlargement from EU25 to EU27. However, a number of regions with 
RCE status on the basis of the calculations presented here, would in fact be eligible as 
‘ Obj ect ive 1’  regions, if the original threshold  75 percent of EU15 GDP(PPS) per head - 
were retained.  
Table 11: Still Objective1 post-2014? RCE regions below EU15 GDP per head threshold 
 ‘Eligible’ regions Population % of population Share of population 
EU27  6653 1.3 100 
EU25  6653 1.4 100 
EU15  6653 1.7 100 
Belgium Luxembourg 
Namur 
726.3 6.8 10.9 
Germany  Lüneburg 1702 2.1 25.6 
Italy Sardegna 1662.5 2.8 25.0 
Austria Burgenland 280.7 3.4 4.2 
Portugal Algarve 424 4.0 6.4 
United Kingdom 
Tees Valley & 
Durham 
Lincolnshire 
1857 3.0 27.9 
Note: This population is in included within the RCE regions in Table 10; some Phasing-in regions are 
also below the EU15 GDP threshold for Objective 1.  
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, some 24 regions are affected by the impact of enlargement on eligibility 
thresholds. Those below the EU25 Convergence threshold would, in principle, be accorded 
Phasing-out status. However, a further 16 regions, with either Phasing-in or RCE status 
would have been eligible for Convergence status on the basis of the EU15 threshold. 
4.3 Financial allocations 
For 2007-13, projected commitment appropriations amounted to 1.048 percent of GNI  
some 864.3 billion (2004 prices); of this 308 billion was allocated to Heading 1b for 
Cohesion Policy.38 The breakdown between the various strands of policy is illustrated in 
Table 12. 
 
                                                 
38 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
budgetary discipline and sound financial management, OJEU No C139/1 of 14 June 2006.  
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Figure 4: Impact of enlargement on Convergence region eligibility 
GDP(PPS) per head
2005-7
Below EU27 Convergence threshold   (65)
Below EU25 Convergence threshold   (8)
Below EU15 Convergence threshold   (16)
Below EU27 average   (54)
Above EU27 average   (124)
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
Table 12: Cohesion policy allocations 2007-13 (2004 prices) 
 € million % 
Convergence regions 177,084 57.5 
Phasing out 12,521 4.1 
Cohesion Fund 58,308 18.9 
Cohesion Fund Transition (Spain) 3,250 1.1 
CONVERGENCE TOTAL 251,163 81.5 
   
RCE regions 38,742 12.6 
Phasing-in 10,385 3.4 
REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS TOTAL 49,128 15.9 
   
Cross-border cooperation 5,576 1.8 
Transnational cooperation 1,582 0.5 
Interregional cooperation 392 0.1 
PEACE 200 0.1 
EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL COOPERATION TOTAL 7,550 2.5 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund, OJEU No L210/25 of 31 
July 2007. 
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This in turn yielded the national breakdown illustrated in Table 13. 
Assessing the implications of shifts in spatial coverage for financial allocations is not 
straightforward. 
x In part, this is because, historically, the initial parameters for calculating the 
allocations have been based on pol it ical  choices (such as an a priori 
EU15/EU10/EU2 split, an Objective 1/Objective 2 share, ring-fencing commitments 
to ensure doubling allocations for the Cohesion countries) and a methodology 
adopted, and then adapted, to deliver those results.  
x Also, the final allocations are the product of protracted and intense negotiations 
through which many of the initial parameters are adjusted.  
x Added to this, there is no obvious starting point for determining what the Cohesion 
policy budget might be post-2014, this essentially also being a political decision.  
x Moreover, and in contrast with national budgetary practices, in the Multiannual 
Financial perspective, the overall budget itself is set not as a fixed absolute 
amount, but rather as a proportion of GNI. 
Despite the large number of unknowns, the approach to allocating funding has a number 
of precedents embedded within it. This is particularly so for allocations to the Convergence 
regions, where the so-called Berlin formula has been applied on two occasions, and the 
allocation for the Cohesion Fund, where the starting point for allocating funds was that the 
aid intensity (ie. amount per head) in 2007-13 should be the same as in 2004-6. In both 
cases, the amounts calculated on the basis of these formulae were subject to two major 
adjustments:  
x for the then new Member States the Convergence region and Cohesion Fund 
allocations were adjusted such that the latter represented one-third of the 
Cohesion Policy total; and 
x of crucial importance, a cap expressed as a proportion of GDP was set on the 
amount that could be allocated to any given Member State.  
Although in principle the cap applied to all countries, in practice it only affected nine 
countries (all EU12), namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The net effect of this was that, for these countries, the cap 
determined the allocation, rather than the Berlin formula and the distribution mechanism 
for the Cohesion Fund. 
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Table 13: Indicative financial allocations, 2007-13 (€ millions, 2004 prices) 
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Belgium   579  1268 173 2020 
Czech Rep 15149 7830   373 346 23698 
Denmark     453 92 545 
Germany  10553  3770  8370 756 23449 
Estonia 1992 1019    47 3058 
Greece 8379 3289 5779 584  186 18217 
Spain 18727 3250 1434 4495 3133 497 31536 
France 2838    9123 775 12736 
Ireland    420 261 134 815 
Italy 18867  388 879 4761 752 25647 
Cyprus  193  363  24 580 
Latvia 2647 1363    80 4090 
Lithuania 3965 2034    97 6096 
Luxembourg     45 13 58 
Hungary 12654 7589  1865  343 22451 
Malta 495 252    14 761 
Netherlands     1477 220 1697 
Austria   159  914 228 1301 
Poland 39486 19562    650 59698 
Portugal 15240 2722 254 407 436 88 19147 
Slovenia 2407 1239    93 3739 
Slovak Rep 6230 3433   399 202 10264 
Finland    491 935 107 1533 
Sweden     1446 236 1682 
UK 2436  158 883 5349 642 9468 
Unallocated      392  
Bulgaria 3873 2015    159 6047 
Romania 11143 5769    404 17316 
EU25  162065 53775 12521 10387 38743 7187 284286 
EU15  77040 9261 12521 8159 37971 4899 149851 
EU10 85025 44514 0 2228 772 1896 134435 
EU27 177081 61559 12521 10387 38743 7750 308041 
Source: European Commission (2006) The Growt h and Jobs St rat egy and t he Reform of  EU Cohesion 
pol icy: Fourt h progress report  on cohesion, COM(2006)281, 12.6.2006. 
The remainder of this discussion focuses on the allocations for the Convergence regions and 
the Cohesion Fund which, in 2007-13, account for over threequarters of total Cohesion 
policy allocations.  
4.3.1 Convergence region allocations 
The basic mechanism for allocating funding to the Convergence regions for 2007-13 was 
modelled on the Berlin formula used for 2000-6. This involved making an allocation based 
on regional disparities in GDP per head, adjusted for national prosperity, and high 
unemployment  the basic principle being that the Convergence region allocation should be 
Setting the stage for the reform of Cohesion policy after 2013 
European Policies Research Paper, No. 77  European Policies Research Centre 34
related to the prosperity gap. The steps involved in the Berlin formula are illustrated in 
Box 2. 
Box 2: Calculation of the annual allocation for Convergence regions 
 
In looking forward, the main change applied to the methodology has been to adjust the 
national prosperity criterion to reflect enlargement from EU25 to EU27. The outcome of 
applying this formula (excluding the unemployment premium) is given in Table 14, 
alongside the Convergence region allocation for 2007-13, but expressed on a common price 
footing for the purposes of comparison.  
The most striking aspect of Table 14 is the budgetary impact of applying the Berlin formula 
unfettered. Even though the calculations presented earlier suggested that the Convergence 
population would fal l  by over 30 million (see Table 2 and Table 7), Table 14 suggests that a 
straight reapplication of the Berlin formula - ie.  wit hout  capping - would require the 
Convergence region budget to more than double from 195 billion to 414 billion. The 
separate treatment of Bulgaria and Romania and the fact that EU25 (not EU27) thresholds 
were used for 2007-13 complicates direct comparisons between 2007-13 and post-2014 
scenarios. However, an unfettered application of the Berlin formula to the EU25 would 
have required funding of around 421 billion for 2007-13 compared to about 281 billion for 
2014-20; in other words, the unadjusted funding for the EU25 falls (due loss of eligibility, 
use of EU27 GDP averages and economic growth) but enlargement to include Bulgaria and 
Romania means that the overall unadjusted amount remains broadly comparable. Reflecting 
this, the most significant increases are for Bulgaria and Romania where Convergence region 
allocations would increase around eight-fold compared to 2007-13.  
1. Calculate difference between regional GDP per head and the EU average. 
2. Multiply result by national prosperity coefficient: 
GNI(PPS) per head – EU27=100 National prosperity coefficient 
< 84.1 
>84.1 <100.9 
>100.9 
4.25% 
3.36% 
2.67% 
3. Gives allocation per head of regional population; multiply by regional population to 
give total regional allocation. 
4. Add 700 per person unemployed in excess of the Convergence region average, if 
applicable. (This is not applied in the discussions that follow; the data are not readily 
available and the addition makes little difference to the outcome). 
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Table 14: Unadjusted Convergence region allocations 2014+? (2009 prices) 
 2007-13 2014-20? 
 Total  € per head per 
annum 
Total € per head per 
annum 
EU27 195026 181 413637 488 
EU25  178488 206 280710 426 
EU15  84846 220 59233 265 
Bulgaria 4266 77 36446 680 
Czech Rep 16684 264 22885 358 
Germany  11623 161 0 0 
Estonia 2194 230 3490 372 
Greece 9228 327 8748 261 
Spain 20625 229 1466 195 
France 3126 255 2521 246 
Italy 20778 178 27006 221 
Latvia 2915 178 8152 512 
Lithuania 4367 180 11094 470 
Hungary 13936 272 28532 568 
Malta 545 197 0 0 
Poland 43487 163 128689 558 
Portugal 16784 341 19491 390 
Romania 12272 80 96481 714 
Slovenia 2651 190 1751 231 
Slovak Rep 6862 205 16885 504 
UK 2683 162 0 0 
Source: Own calculations from Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 2006/594/EC (as amended) and 
Eurostat data, using standard Cohesion policy deflator of 2 percent. 
4.3.2 Cohesion Fund allocations 
For 2007-13 there were two elements to the allocation of the Cohesion Fund, the first of 
which applied to all eligible Member States and the second only to the EU12 Member States. 
The first phase involved the distribution of a theoretical financial envelope obtained by 
multiplying average aid intensity of 44.7 per head per annum (2004 prices) by the eligible 
population.39 This sum was allocated on the basis of a distribution key which took account 
of eligible Member State shares of population and surface area, adjusted by national GNI to 
favour the poorer Member States. For Greece and Portugal, the Cohesion Fund allocation 
was the outcome of this method. As noted earlier, Spain had ceased to qualify for the 
Cohesion Fund for 2007-13, but it successfully negotiated separate transitional 
arrangements.  
For the EU12 Member States, there was a second stage which involved adjusting the 
Cohesion Fund allocation so that it represented one-third of the Cohesion policy allocation 
over the 2007-13 period. 
The calculations presented below take the 2007-13 annual aid intensity for the Cohesion 
Fund (excluding the transitional arrangements for Spain) as the basis for determining the 
Cohesion Fund budget for 2014-20; this yields a budget for the period of around 58 billion, 
                                                 
39 The Commission had proposed that the same aid intensity should apply in 2007-13 as in 2004-06.  
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which is in turn divided among the eligible Member States according to the distribution key 
described above. Whether or not this figure is valid as a starting point is debatable since, 
for 2007-13, the overall Cohesion Fund budget was increased from the initial figure owing 
to the requirement that the Cohesion Fund account for one-third of the Cohesion policy 
allocations of the new Member States. Nevertheless, the notable feature of the outcome 
shown in Table 15 is that the Cohesion Fund budget is contained since a set amount is 
distributed according to a key, at least in the first instance, rather than being contingent 
on the scale of disparities. In considering Table 15 it is important to note that the one-third 
adjustment for the EU12 has not  been applied at this stage. 
As mentioned earlier, it is scarcely conceivable that some form of transitional arrangement 
would not be made for Greece  assuming that the criteria remained unchanged and Greece 
became ineligible on the basis of the latest data. However, on the basis of 2006-8 GNI data, 
Portugal is the only EU15 country that would qualify. In principle, it would also therefore be 
the only country where the Cohesion Fund contribution was not readjusted to represent 
one-third of the total. Assuming that the one-third rule remains in place, the outcomes 
shown in Table 15 would therefore only apply to Portugal.  
Table 15: Unadjusted Cohesion Fund allocations 2014+? (2009 prices) 
 2007-13 2014-20? 
 Total  € per head per 
annum 
Total € per head per 
annum 
EU27 66466 58 58409 73 
EU25 58062 62 36834 62 
EUR15 9999 24 3635 49 
Bulgaria 2175 40 6772 126 
Czech Republic 8454 121 5280 73 
Estonia 1100 118 1176 125 
Greece 3551 47 0 0 
Spain 3509 13 0 0 
Cyprus 209 43 270 49 
Latvia 1472 92 1912 120 
Lithuania 2196 92 2113 89 
Hungary 8194 118 4092 58 
Malta 272 100 150 52 
Poland 21121 81 15538 58 
Portugal 2939 41 3635 49 
Romania 6229 42 14803 98 
Slovenia 1337 98 623 44 
Slovakia 3706 100 2043 54 
Source: Own calculations from Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 2006/594/EC (as amended) and 
Eurostat data, using standard Cohesion policy deflator of 2 percent. 
4.3.3 Outcomes and the impact of capping 
As already mentioned, for nine Member States, a crucial feature of the 2007-13 
methodology was the imposition of an annual limit on transfers expressed as a percentage 
of projected GDP for that year. Initially the cap had been set at four percent and restricted 
to the EU10 Member States. However, in the course of the negotiations, the cap was 
generalised and made progressive so that the poorer the Member State, the higher could be 
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the Cohesion policy allocations as a proportion of GDP. At the same time, however, the 
limit was reduced to below four percent in all cases; moreover, as Table 16 shows, the 
system of limits was not meaningful ly generalised, as the cap only appears to bite in the 
case of the poorest countries. 
Table 16: Absorption cap 2007-13 
 
GNI(PPS) per head 
(EU25=100) Cap - % of GDP Allocation affected? 
Latvia 39.5 3.7893 Yes 
Lithuania 42.4 3.7135 Yes 
Estonia 44.4 3.7135 Yes 
Poland 45.5 3.7135 Yes 
Slovak Republic 51.1 3.6188 Yes 
Hungary 55.7 3.5240 Yes 
Czech Republic 64.9 3.4293 Yes 
Malta 73.5 3.2398 No 
Portugal 75.2 3.1498 No 
Slovenia 75.7 3.1498 No 
Greece 77.9 3.1498 No 
Cyprus 82.5 3.0598 No 
Spain 94.1 2.8798 No 
Germany  108.7 2.6098 No 
Italy 108.7 2.6098 No 
Ireland 110.8 2.5198 No 
Finland 113.6 2.5198 No 
France 114.0 2.5198 No 
Sweden 115.6 2.4298 No 
United Kingdom 119.6 2.4298 No 
Belgium 120.2 2.3398 No 
Austria 121.1 2.3398 No 
Netherlands 121.5 2.3398 No 
Denmark 122.9 2.3398 No 
Luxembourg 195.3 0.9898 No 
Source: General Regulation Annex II, paragraph 7 and own calculations from AMECO and Eurostat data 
and Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013, Fiche No. 1b. 
Looking forward, and reapplying the same approach to limiting Cohesion policy spending as 
a percentage of GDP implies the application of the ceilings set out in Table 17. Of course, it 
should be pointed out that, in reality, it seems unlikely that these thresholds would simply 
be reapplied in the manner suggested here. The thresholds arrived at in Table 16 are 
clearly the result of a process of reverse engineering the methodology in order to produce 
an outcome that can be accommodated; it seems probable that such an approach would 
dominate were the methodology to be rolled forward for the post-2014 period.  
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Table 17: Absorption cap post-2014? 
 GNI(PPS) EU27=100 (2006-8) Ceiling as % of GDP 
   
Bulgaria 37.2 3.7893 
Romania 40.5 3.7135 
Poland 52.7 3.6188 
Latvia 53.9 3.6188 
Lithuania 57.2 3.524 
Hungary 59.0 3.524 
Estonia 63.5 3.4293 
Slovakia 65.6 3.3346 
Portugal 73.4 3.2398 
Czech Republic 74.8 3.2398 
Malta 74.9 3.2398 
Cyprus 86.1 2.9698 
Slovenia 88.1 2.9698 
Greece 91.7 2.8798 
Italy 101.3 2.6998 
Spain 102.8 2.6998 
France 110.0 2.5198 
Finland 116.1 2.4298 
Germany 118.3 2.4298 
Belgium 119.8 2.4298 
United Kingdom 120.8 2.3398 
Denmark 122.1 2.3398 
Austria 122.7 2.3398 
Sweden 124.3 2.3398 
Ireland 126.2 2.2498 
Netherlands 132.7 2.1598 
Luxembourg  213.8 0.7198 
Source: General Regulation Annex II, paragraph 7 and own calculations from Ameco data.  
A key difficulty in calculating the potential impact of capping is that it is based on GDP 
forecasts for the funding period. The Commission devised forecasts for the period 2007-13 
specially for the purpose of establishing capping values, official DG ECFIN forecasts being 
available only up to 2006. This meant, in effect, that the budget allocation for most of the 
EU12 was based on 2004 GDP to which growth forecasts were applied. There are practical 
difficulties in reapplying this approach  not least the absence of any GDP forecasts beyond 
2011 from DG ECFIN. This is a significant problem for predicting financial allocations 
resulting from changes in spatial coverage since the overall ceiling on financial allocations 
is sensitive to the growth rate applied to GDP. In the absence of any other indications, the 
approach adopted here is to apply the same annual growth rate for all countries for 2014-20 
as the Commission has forecast for the EU27 for 2011, this being 1.6 percent. This is clearly 
unrealistic, but it probably errs on the side of caution. 
To summarise the above, the outcomes presented Table 18 are based on the following 
assumptions: 
x annual allocations are subject to a ceiling expressed as a percentage of GDP as 
given in Table 17; 
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x the Autumn 2009 economic forecast growth rates are used up to 2011 
x for 2012 to 2020 a uniform annual growth rate of 1.6 percent is applied 
x it is assumed that, for the EU12, the Cohesion Fund would account for one-third of 
the Cohesion policy allocation.40 
Table 18: Convergence allocations 2014-20? (2009 prices) 
 2007-13 2014-20 
 Convergence CF Convergence CF 
 Total €m € ph pa Total €m € ph pa Total €m € ph pa Total €m € ph pa 
EU27 195,026 181 67,795 58 208,961 250 78,920 99 
EU25 178,488 206 59,223 62 179,454 277 64,166 108 
EU15 84,846 220 10,199 24 59,233 279 3,635 49 
Bulgaria 4,266 77 2,219 40 6,722 125 3,361 62 
Czech Rep 16,684 264 8,623 121 18,777 295 9,388 131 
Germany 11,623 161 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 2,194 230 1,122 118 2,517 267 1,259 133 
Greece 9,228 327 3,622 47 8,748 438 0 0 
Spain 20,625 229 3,579 13 1,466 195 0 0 
France 3,126 255 0 0 2,521 198 0 0 
Italy 20,778 178 0 0 27,006 221 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 213 43 0 0 270 50 
Latvia 2,915 178 1,501 92 3,415 213 1,708 106 
Lithuania 4,367 180 2,240 92 4,768 200 2,384 100 
Hungary 13,936 272 8,358 118 17,282 342 8,641 122 
Malta 545 197 278 100 0 0 150 53 
Poland 43,487 163 21,544 81 60,541 262 30,270 113 
Portugal 16,784 341 2,998 41 19,491 390 3,635 49 
Romania 12,272 80 6,354 42 22,785 168 11,393 75 
Slovenia 2,651 190 1,364 98 1,582 209 791 56 
Slovakia 6,862 205 3,780 100 11,339 338 5,669 150 
UK 2,683 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Special provisions made for the Outermost Regions (in addition to the Convergence allocation) 
have not been included in the 2014-20 calculations. The standard Cohesion policy deflator of 2 
percent has been applied. It appears that eight countries would be subject to capping: Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania.  
Source: Own calculations from Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 2006/594/EC (as amended); 
Eurostat data; and DG ECFIN autumn economic forecasts.  
The outcomes shown in Table 18 should be treated with caution  not just because of the 
assumptions regarding growth rates, but also because the full details of the Commission 
capping methodology have never been disclosed. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, even 
if a zero growth rate were assumed for all Member States for 2012-20, the Cohesion budget 
for 2014-20 would still be about 197 billion for the Convergence regions and 73 billion for 
the Cohesion Fund. 
                                                 
40 This is not applied to Cyprus and Malta, which do not qualify for Convergence policy under the 
latest data.  
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What is driving these outcomes? A combination of two factors is at work. First, Convergence 
status continues to cover most the territories of most of the EU12 (except Cyprus and 
Malta). Second, many of these countries have experienced high growth rates over the 
period since 2004. Of course many, most notably the Baltic states, experienced a severe 
recession especially in 2009; however in no case did this wipe out the growth of the 
preceding period  indeed, in all the central and eastern European and Baltic states except 
Hungary, cumulated real GDP growth in 2004-9 was above the EU27 average. The 
consequence of this is that while most of these territories remain poor enough to be 
eligible for Convergence status, the increase in GDP has raised the level at which transfers 
are capped.  
4.3.4 Assessment 
The calculations in this section, especially regarding financial allocations, contain a number 
of caveats, not least relating to the application of the capping methodology. Nevertheless, 
it is fair to conclude that the existing approach to Convergence region and Cohesion Fund 
allocations cannot be reapplied largely unchanged. This is because, even assuming very 
modest (or zero) growth rates for the period 2012-20, the budget for these two strands of 
policy would exceed that for 2007-13, even though the eligible population is substantially 
smaller. Against this background, there are a number of options. 
First, there could be a mechanistic reduction of the Convergence allocation for all 
eligible regions to constrain the allocation within a fixed budget.  This approach was used 
for Objective 1 allocations in 2000-6, where a reduction coefficient was applied uniformly 
to Objective 1 allocations in order for the Objective 1 budget to remain within a notional 
budget maximum.41 The disadvantage of this approach is that it dilutes the contribution to 
the poverty gap for all Member States. However, it would impact particularly on the EU15 
countries and some EU12 countries would still receive a much higher allocation than in 
2007-13. 
Second, there could be a mechanistic reduction of the Convergence allocation with 
different reduction coefficients for EU12 and EU15. This raises practical questions such 
as the basis for the reduction  although past aid intensities could be used as a baseline. 
However, perhaps more importantly, there is the question of whether it is politically 
acceptable explicitly to reduce the amounts under the Berlin method more for the EU12 
than for the EU15. 
Third, capping could be reconfigured. In practice, capping determined the allocations for 
most of the EU12 for 2007-13. However, indications in this paper suggest that the existing 
method will result in Convergence region and Cohesion Fund budgets that are too high to be 
acceptable to net payers and non-beneficiaries of these policy strands. As capping drives 
the allocations for the main beneficiaries, an obvious solution would be to lower the 
absorption cap as a percentage of GDP across the board. It could also be argued that this 
should be set a percentage of a single years GDP, rather than as a percentage of forecast 
                                                 
41 Note, however, that final allocations were complemented by a lengthy list of special provisions, 
which partially undermined the application of the methodology.  
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GDP, not least since these forecasts have proved to be wildly inaccurate.42 The question 
remains, however, of whether it is acceptable in effect to apply the Berlin formula only to 
a minority of the population covered by the Convergence objective.  
Of course, all of the above could be subject to almost endless permutations, whether it be 
reduction coefficients, changes in the weight allocated to poor regions or to poor countries 
in the Berlin formula, a reconsideration of the one-third rule for the Cohesion Fund in the 
new Member States, flat rate absorption limits, allocations driven by previous aid intensity, 
and so on. However, whatever the scope for tweaking the Berlin formula and the capping 
methodology, it is questionable whether the existing architecture for determining Cohesion 
policy allocations is robust enough to be rolled forward in such changed economic 
conditions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 2007-9 forecasts for Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia were out by 7.5, 8 and 10.8 percent, 
respectively, leading to an adjustment in their Cohesion policy allocations  see COM(2010)160 final of 
16 April 2010. 
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5. COHESION POLICY DIRECTIONS 2014+: PERFORMANCE, 
PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 
Looking forward at the substance of policy, the extensive investment in evaluation and 
other research has continued over the past year, with further insights on the performance 
of the policy supplemented by the first strategic reports from Member States. The 
Commission has also been mobilising debate on the future of the policy, particularly 
through the High-Level Group of Member States. As the Fifth Cohesion Report is finalised, 
some indication of the future directions of policy are becoming apparent, as well as the 
views of Member States on different aspects of the likely directions. The following section 
reviews each of these issues in turn. 
5.1 Reviewing performance across the EU 
Various studies and policy reports have become available over the past year offering 
insights into the effectiveness of Cohesion policy and, in some cases, policy 
recommendations to inform future policy directions. The key EU-wide analyses include the 
ex-post evaluation of the 2000-20006 period, preparatory studies undertaken as part of the 
Fifth Cohesion Report, and the results of the strategic reporting exercise. 
5.1.1 Learning from the past: the 2000-2006 ex-post evaluation 
The ex-post evaluation of the 2000-06 programmes is the responsibility of the Commission 
in cooperation with the Member States. The approach taken by the Commission is 
significantly different from the past, with a far higher priority given to the exercise, an 
increased budget, a much stronger onus on quality and quality management, and a more 
targeted and thematically oriented focus through 11 inter-linked Working Packages. The 
findings of several working packages have been examined in detail elsewhere.43 A summary 
of some of the key findings is presented in Box 3. 
A synthesis report of the evaluation was presented in February in 2010 to draw out the main 
points from each of the working packages and from examining all of the material in the 
round.44 A number of key policy implications and recommendations were distilled. The first 
set concerned policy objectives: 
x greater clarity is needed on the relative priority attached to different policy 
objectives when formulating programmes;  
x more concentration of expenditure is needed to ensure a tangible impact and to 
achieve critical mass;  
                                                 
43 Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2009) Challenges, Consultations and Concepts: Preparing for 
the Cohesion Policy Debate, EoRPA Paper 09/6, European Regional Policy Research Consortium, EPRC, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.   
44 Ward T (2010) Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2000-06 co-financed by the ERDF 
(Objective 1 & 2), Synthesis Report, DG Regional Policy, Brussels. 
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x objectives and measures should be determined in a bottom-up and flexible way, but 
taking account of national and EU strategies and objectives.  
Box 3: Key Findings of the Ex post Evaluation of the ERDF in 2000-2006 45 
 
Global impacts 
x The creation of 710,000 jobs in Objective 1 regions and 730,000 in Objective 2 regions at the end of 2006. 
x Increased long-term productive economic potential and the level of GDP in Objective 1 regions, e.g. 
cumulative effect on GDP from 2000 to 2009 of +0.5% in EU15 and +3.7% in the EU10. 
x A macro-economic simulation suggests that the entire EU was better off with cohesion policy than without, 
notably because of increased trade effects. 
 
Structural change & globalisation  
x Path-dependencies can be changed by long-term, well defined regional policies.  
x Objective 2 programmes are most effective when they reinforce regional policies and do not pursue additional 
objectives. 
x The ERDF contribution is most effective when interventions are focused on innovation and internationalisation. 
 
Enterprise and innovation 
x SMEs received 83% (22.9 billion) of support to businesses. For instance, 40,000 micro-enterprises were 
created in Germany over the six year period. 
x Nearly 38,000 R&D projects received support with the creation of over 13,000 new long term research jobs 
x Significant contribution to R&D expenditure in Objective 1 regions, adding some 12% to national spending in 
Portugal, 7% in Greece and 6% in Spain and even more in some of the EU 10 countries, especially Estonia  
 
Transport 
x Support for the building of 2 000 km of motorways (24% of all motorway development in the period) and 4 000 
km of rail. For instance, it contributed to a reduction of 20% in travel time on rail corridors in the Czech 
Republic. 
x 100.000 km of roads were built or improved, e.g. a 46% reduction in journey time on major road corridors in 
Ireland. 
x The modernization of 31 airports and 45 sea ports 
x Improvement of intermodal links, establishing connections between ports, airports, road network and rail 
network.  
 
Environment 
x 25.5 billion spent on environment-related interventions in 2000-06. 
x 14 million more people connected to modern water supply systems; 
x 20 million more people with waste water treatment  through ERDF support, which represents half of the total 
increase throughout Europe in the period; 
x The European Commission needs to explicitly state that meeting the EU environmental requirements is an 
objective of Cohesion Policy even if it does not lead in the short term to economic growth. 
 
Rural Development 
x The ERDF contributed significantly to development in rural areas, in both Objective 1 and 2 regions. 
x Cohesion Policy should make its contribution more visible to citizens in rural areas 
 
Gender & demography 
x Demography was not a priority at the start of the period, but regions have supported relevant projects  
x It is not enough to set gender equality as a horizontal priority; specific, tangible actions are needed.  
x The number of horizontal priorities should be limited to those relevant to the regions. 
 
Management & Implementation systems 
x EU-10 managed to put in place systems to correctly draw down resources: significant improvements over time 
and positive spillovers on domestic governance systems. 
x Both EU-10 & EU-15 need a stronger focus on result 
 
 
On the spatial focus of policy, the report calls for:  
                                                 
45 DG Regional Policy (2010) Panorama issue on Evaluating Regional Policy Insights and results, No. 
33, Spring 2010, DG Regional Policy, Brussels;  Commission Press Release (2010) Commission assesses 
cohesion policy's achievements: around 1.4 million jobs created in Europe in 2000-2006, IP/10/444, 
19th April 2010, Brussels. 
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x policy to be determined, or at least coordinated, at an appropriate spatial level 
(including functional areas), which will vary according to the type of policy 
intervention; 
x and for a greater policy interest to be given to achieving territorial balance within 
regions.  
For better policy design and assessment, improvements are needed in indicators and data 
requirements: 
x better indicators are needed to capture and measure the objectives of policy, 
particularly on multi-dimensional concepts such as social cohesion (including at a 
level below NUTS 2) and on environmental effects;  
x expenditure data on national policies sources should be more readily available so that 
they can be examined in relation to spending financed by the Structural Funds 
x account needs to be taken of the impact of commuting on GDP per head in NUTS 2 
regions when designing and assessing policy. 
Several policy implications were raised in relation to specific areas of intervention:  
x Ent erprise support : consideration should be given to whether the ERDF should fund 
aid to large enterprises given the significant deadweight effects, while support for 
SMEs needs to be targeted on strategic objectives. More impact analysis is also 
needed  
x Transport  intervent ions: recognition is needed on the case for expanding support for 
investment in urban transport and intermodal links (given the major potential for 
reducing congestion and emissions). In the EU12, transport infrastructure support 
needs to pay more attention to environmental impacts. On the other hand, due to 
the questionable impacts on development or environmental considerations, 
consideration should be given to whether the ERDF should continue to finance the 
construction of high-speed rail lines, the modernisation and extension of regional 
airports and ports, the construction of new roads in the EU15 and road maintenance. 
x Environment al  proj ect s: the case for intervention in terms of the objectives of 
cohesion policy needs to be spelled out and justified. Investment in environmental 
infrastructure needs to be linked with regional development  
Lastly, a number of management and implementation recommendations were made, 
mainly related to monitoring and evaluation: 
x more focused evaluations examining effectiveness and different interventions rather 
process issues or absorption;  
x the use of rigorous methods should be encouraged; 
x indicators need to be directly related to programme objectives at the planning stage;  
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x regular collection and publishing of data is required; 
x monitoring and evaluation system should be an integral part of the decision-making 
process, requiring political buy-in;  
x greater public scrutiny and debate on policy objectives and performance;  
x Member States should be obliged to produce data on the unit costs of large projects 
to enable comparison across regions and countries;  
The other management-related recommendations concerned programme formulation (more 
detailed and informed negotiation between the Commission and the Member States 
needed); financial management (for the n+2 rule to be revised); and project selection (to 
outlaw the practice of allocating funding to pre-financed projects).  
5.1.2 Informing thinking on the future: thematic studies  
To inform Commission thinking on the future of Cohesion policy and to feed into the Fifth 
Cohesion Report preparatory work, DG Regio commissioned several studies on specific 
aspects of policy performance or on economic development policies more generally. A 
number of these were published during 2010, covering the themes of policy objectives, 
financial leverage, governance, and the regional impact of global pressures. 
The social objectives of policy are examined through a study on social equity, which 
provides a detailed statistical analysis of social mobility and interpersonal inequality 
disparities and trends across EU regions. 46 The studys key policy conclusion is that EU 
Cohesion policy can (and does) play an important role in addressing social inequalities and 
in promoting social mobility, through three different routes.  
x First, interventions to support education and training are the most likely to promote 
social mobility per se, notably: the improvement of education infrastructure; 
measures to increase participation in education and training throughout the life-
cycle; updating skills of training personnel with a view to innovation and a knowledge 
based economy; and, development of life-long learning systems and strategies in 
firms. Transport infrastructure may also contribute, where it improves access to 
education and employment opportunities to groups with low mobility.  
x Second, Cohesion policy has considerable scope to reduce income inequality through 
pro-poor growth interventions, particularly: active and preventive labour market 
measures; creating pathways to the integration and re-entry into employment for 
disadvantaged people; combating discrimination in the labour market; increasing 
female participation in the labour market (including childcare); and, actions to 
increase migrants participation in employment.  
                                                 
46 GHK (2010) Social  Mobil i t y and Int ra-Regional Income Dist ribut ion across EU Member St at es, Final 
Report, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels. 
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x Third, the policy areas that provide the most potential for promoting a reduction in 
intra-regional inequality are environment infrastructure, social inclusion and related 
public services interventions.  
However, the extent and relative importance placed on the objective of social equity 
remains unclear and requires clarification in the policys design and constitutive principles. 
At an operational level, the report argues that the relevance, emphasis and potential of the 
three social equity priorities could be usefully examined in ex ante and ex post impact 
assessment of Cohesion policy interventions at the regional level and that the simulation 
model developed as part of the project could provide a useful tool in this respect. 
The theme of financial leverage is examined from different angles in two studies on 
additionality and public capital stocks.  Based on a review of existing theoretical and 
empirical research, the additionality study47  concluded that the rationale for the principle 
is theoretically sound, given the broad consensus in the literature on the potentially net 
positive impacts of public expenditure on long-run economic growth, albeit under specific 
conditions. More critically, however, it argues that the way in which the additionality 
principle is operationalised and enforced in Cohesion policy fails to take account of the 
complexities of public expenditure and its relationship with economic growth. It concludes 
that the Commission should move away from the current one-size-fits-all verification 
approach towards a country-by-country approach, possibly based on spending reviews. A 
formal spending review approach with negotiation of suitable monitoring indicators for each 
country could be one way forward. But the more politically feasible approach would involve 
setting aggregate and disaggregate targets as ratios of expenditures to GDP, with each 
Member State providing: an ex-ante target of overall public spending on a suitable 
harmonized definition of expenditure; and a breakdown of the target by a core set of 
sectors, such as transport or environment, to limit the scope for opportunistic substitution 
effects. A default clause for renegotiation under specific circumstances could also be 
foreseen under this approach. 
The second study was of a pilot nature and aimed to assess the feasibility of estimating 
capital stocks for the EU27 at regional level.48 The rationale for the study is that analysis of 
the impact of expenditure shifts, particularly the injection of Structural Funds, on the 
regional distribution of the capital stock is often compromised by a lack of adequate data. 
The main conclusion of the report is that it would be possible to update and regularly 
publish capital stock estimates at NUTS2 level for the EU27 countries, employing a version 
of the so-called Perpetual Inventory Method used in the study and by many national 
statistical offices across the EU. The report also puts forward several methodological 
recommendations on how to develop and improve the capital stock statistics used in the 
report. 
                                                 
47 CSIL (2010) Impact  of  Addit ional i t y on t he Real Economy of  t he EU Member St at es: Open quest ions, 
some fact s and a review of  t he l i t erat ure, Final Report, DG Regional Policy 
48 Cambridge Econometrics (2010) Pilot  St udy on t he Est imat ion of  Regional Capit al  St ocks, Final  
Report , DG Regional Policy, European Commission Brussels,  
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Understanding how responsibilities, competences and financial resources are distributed 
between levels of government and the costs involved is important for the efficient design 
and implementation of Cohesion policy. With this objective in mind, two studies 
commissioned by DG Regional Policy have focussed on the governance of regional policy.  
The first analyses the distribution of domestic regional policy competences across EU 
Member States.49 Among the key conclusions are the following:   
x local authorities are key and increasingly important actors across the EU, especially 
in EU12 countries;  
x in regionalised countries, central and intermediate levels of government tend to have 
shared competences in all areas relevant to economic development, while Nordic 
countries have a tradition of decentralisation with respect to the provision and 
development of public services; and 
x regional development policies remain highly centralised in unitary countries, despite 
the increasing devolution of regional development competences in recent years.  
Turning to expenditure, the report finds that development policies accounted for some 3 
percent of GDP and 14 percent of total gross fixed capital formation in the EU27 during the 
2000-2006 period, with an average contribution from EU Cohesion Policy in the order of 11 
percent (but significantly higher in some of the least developed countries, i.e. 80 percent in 
Latvia and Lithuania). In examining trends over time, a key conclusion is that national 
experiences have varied dependent on national budgetary policy trends, and that the 
macroeconomic influence of Cohesion Policy has been strongly influenced by the public 
finance context and the overall level of expenditure for development in different countries. 
Importantly, the growth of expenditure for development in the EU after 2000 suggests a 
relative reduction in the prioritisation of the poorest regions relative to wealthier regions 
within many countries (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany and the EU12). EU 
Cohesion policy has therefore played an important role in countering this unbalanced 
distribution of public investment (especially in Italy, Portugal and in many EU12 countries). 
The increasingly polemical issue of administrative costs in EU Cohesion policy was analysed 
in the other governance study.50 It confirms that the costs are indeed high, both in terms of 
time and the share of funding (3-4 percent of eligible expenditure) spent on EU Cohesion 
Policy. The majority of these costs are accounted for by programme management functions, 
particularly project selection and the verification of deliverables. However, the study also 
reveals that the costs are relatively modest in comparison with other EU policies, such as 
global and regional partnership programmes and bilateral aid programmes.   
In line with the increasing attention being placed on the regional implications of global 
pressures, two studies were commissioned by DG Regio to examine the impacts of 
                                                 
49 ISMERI-Europa and Applica (2010) Dist ribut ion of  Compet ences in relat ion t o Regional Development  
Pol icies in t he Member St at es of  t he European Union. Final Report, DG Regional Policy, Brussels. 
50 SWECO (2010) Regional governance in t he cont ext  of  global isat ion: The administ rat ive cost s of  EU 
Cohesion Pol icy, Final Report, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels. 
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globalisation (trade liberalisation) and technological change on EU regions. Based on EU27 
quantitative analysis and a sample of qualitative case studies, a key finding of an earlier 
globalisation impact study is that sectoral structure is not the main factor in explaining the 
vulnerability of regions to the consequence of increased trade, but that other general 
factors relating to development and competitiveness are more relevant.51 Given the wide 
variability in the regions designated as being particularly vulnerable, the report argues 
that policies should be sufficiently differentiated to respond to this heterogeneity. It also 
argues that the analysis provides support for policy to focus on embedding firms (especially 
large ones) within the region or to support spillover effects from these firms to the region - 
for which the level of basic and tertiary education are critical factors  as well as 
supporting the exploitation of territorial assets. Further regional policy implications were 
developed in the more recent follow-up study on the regions benefitting from globalisation, 
including several lessons and recommendations to be applied more generally:52  
x to support regions in opening their local economies so that they can exploit the 
advantages deriving from an integrated world economy;  
x to avoid generic assistance and to develop job-creating policies only in those sectors 
and activities that show a capacity to increase productivity growth;  
x to facilitate a transition to higher value added activities in regions dominated by 
labour-intensive sectors;  
x to support innovation, defined broadly;  
x to pursue both short-term and long-term objectives; 
x and to exploit and reinforce territorial assets and core competences (i.e. a place-
based approach), including the use of FDI incentives. 
The need for a place-based approach was also a central policy recommendation in the 
prospective study on the impact of technological change on EU regions.53 In particular, it 
argues that excellence-based and place-based innovation policies can be mutually 
compatible; while scientific excellence policies may not be very important for every region, 
place-based specialisation and innovation policies are required to enhance knowledge 
absorption and diffusion capacities and to encourage smart specialisation in all regions. As 
basic framework conditions are a pre-condition for such policies, the report argues that 
support for the quality of government in general and the governance of innovation policy in 
particular is essential, especially in lagging regions.  
                                                 
51 IGEAT, Politecnico di Milano, UMS Riate (2008) The impact  of  global isat ion and increased t rade 
l iberal isat ion on European regions, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels. 
52 Politecnico di Milano, Bocconi University and IGEAT (2010) Regions Benef it ing f rom Global isat ion 
and Increased Trade, Vol.1, Final Report, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels.  
53 Wintjes R and Hollanders H (2010) The regional  impact  of  t echnological  change in 2020, Synt hesis 
Report , Final Report, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels. 
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5.1.3  Mid-term achievements and lessons: Strategic Report ing  
Reporting on the achievement of policy objectives has been institutionalised at the Council 
level in this period through the new strategic reporting requirements. Member States must 
submit two reports by the end of 2009 and 2012 to assess the progress and challenges with 
programme performance. These reports are synthesised by the Commission and sent to the 
Council and other EU institutions for examination and debate.  
The Commissions synthesis report indicates that across the EU a strong commitment has 
been made to implementing programme aims established at the outset.54 On the basis of 
Member States data, the Commission reports that 27 percent of funding had been assigned 
to projects by the start of 2010, a rate that is similar across the different funding 
objectives as well as Lisbon-related expenditure. On the other hand, there are marked 
variations across countries, from close to 10 percent (Greece) to more than 60 percent 
(Belgium). In terms of specific thematic areas and interventions, the main areas facing 
delays in some Member States are the rail sector, certain energy and environmental 
investments, the digital economy (broadband and ICT use in the public and business 
sectors), social inclusion, and governance and capacity building measures.  
The key obstacles to implementation reported by Member States were the following. 
x t he economic crisis, which has led to generalised low levels of business investment 
and activity and to strains on public finances, thereby generating take-
up/implementation challenges in many countries/regions, although a package of anti-
crisis measures have been introduced to support financial implementation.  
x syst emic factors concerning EU rules, notably delays in agreeing EU legislation (the 
budget, Regulations and Community Strategic Guidelines) and the adoption of 
programmes; changes in the rules on financial control, requiring adjustments to 
control systems; and the complexity of managing overlapping programming periods; 
and 
x domest ic management  issues, such as unclear distribution of tasks nationally, 
insufficient experience, lack of administrative capacity at both managing authorities 
and beneficiaries and internal reorganisation processes of public administrations. 
Reporting on physical implementation was more uneven as not all Member States provided 
the Commission with data on core indicators. It was therefore not possible to aggregate 
data on outputs to the EU27 level. Looking to the future, the main conclusions and 
recommendations put forward by the Commission were two-fold.  
x First, while the strategic reporting exercise is an improvement in accountability in 
the delivery of policy objectives compared to the previous period, the 2012 national 
                                                 
54  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Cohesion policy: Strategic Report 
2010, on the implementation of the programmes 2007-2013, SEC(2010)360, European Commission, 
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reports should be improved so that they are more concise and more focussed on 
outputs, results and strategic developments.  
x Second, a more thorough peer review process and results oriented policy is 
necessary, requiring the Member State to ensure that future annual programme 
reports are accompanied by accurate and complete data to better understand 
programme content and through reinforced reporting on core indicators across all 
Member States.  
The General Affairs Council of the Council of Ministers adopted conclusions on the 
Commission 2010 strategic report in mid-June 2010 under the Spanish Presidency. 55  It 
endorsed the Commissions report and conclusions, as well as putting forward some general 
ideas on the future direction of policy:  
x the need for the policy to have an important role within the Europe 2020 Strategy, as 
had already been emphasised in the March European Council conclusions;  
x the need to concentrate on a limited number of priorities but leaving sufficient 
flexibility for Member States and regions to determine the most appropriate policy 
mix 
x the need for one strategic approach and common implementation rules for the three 
funds (ERDF, CF and ESF);  
x the need for further streamlining administrative procedures; 
x and the need to better address problems faced by transition regions by considering a 
similar solution to that adopted in the current period.  
5.2 The reform process 
The Commission has the lead role in organising the Cohesion policy reform process during 
the agenda-setting phase, given its monopoly right over legislative initiative. The 
Commissions approach has been similar to previous policy reviews, involving the launch of 
formal consultation processes to gather stakeholder views, the publication of Cohesion 
Reports and progress reports to communicate consultation results and developments in 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and the dissemination of evaluation findings to 
feed into the debate on the policys performance. The more novel features of DG Regional 
Policys approach this time round are: the commissioning of an independent report  the 
Barca Report  to assess the policy and propose reform recommendations;56 the setting up 
of a Task Force on Simplification with a select national experts to consider how to reduce 
administrative burdens; the publication of several orientations documents and papers to 
stimulate debate; and the creation of a High-Level Group Reflecting on Future Cohesion 
                                                 
55 Council of the European Union (2010) Council  conclusions on t he St rat egic Report  of  2010 by t he 
Commission on t he Implement at ion of  t he Cohesion Pol icy Programmes, 14 June 2010, 3023rd Foreign 
Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg.  
56 For a summary of the report and reactions see: Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2009) op. cit .  
Setting the stage for the reform of Cohesion policy after 2013 
European Policies Research Paper, No. 77  European Policies Research Centre 52
Policy to engage national policymakers in the process. On the DG Employment side, a 
similar ad hoc group was set up to examine the future of the ESF, including the organisation 
of a high-level conference on the contribution of the ESF to the Europe 2020 strategy - 
Shaping the future of the ESF - ESF and Europe 2020 - on 23-24 June 2010 in Brussels. 
The assessment of the Commissions overall approach by the national policymakers 
interviewed is generally positive, particularly in terms of the more active involvement and 
engagement with national actors. The increased openness, particularly through the 
establishment of the High-Level Group, has been welcomed as a useful way of creating 
more transparency and ownership of the reform process among the Member States. 
Combined with the various papers and orientations documents produced by the 
Commission, the approach has helped to stimulate debate and a stronger community spirit 
amongst the policy actors involved.  
Despite the positive overall assessment, several criticisms were raised. First, the initiation 
and momentum of the process has been slower than it could have been, partly due to the 
relatively high turnover of Commissioners and some senior staff. In the context of a 
relatively tight reform timetable, this presents obstacles to achieving consensus on key 
issues at this informal stage. Second, the Commissions approach has been fragmented, 
with limited coordination (or outright conflict) between DG Regio and other DGs (DG 
Employment, DG Agriculture and DG Budget) or within the DGs as evidenced by the 
differing views put forward by cabinets and other staff. Third, there has been a lack of 
leadership by DG Regional Policy in championing a particular stance on key issues, 
preferring instead to formulate options and questions. Fourth, the discussion topics have 
been selected in a rather haphazard way or have been excessively technical for this stage 
of the discussions. Lastly, the discussions have been somewhat exclusive and closed off 
from wider EU debates, notably on territorial cohesion and the Europe 2020 agenda.  
Policymaker views of the Commissioner Samecki orientations paper, published in 
December 2009, were similarly mixed. Overall, it was seen as good contribution at its time 
- sparking one of the best discussions in the High-Level Group according to one participant - 
and providing a useful input to debates within the Member States. For instance, the paper 
was used by policy-makers in Poland to organise debates among partners at the end of 
2009, and was regarded as containing useful arguments, observations and proposals to steer 
the discussions. A related, positive feature highlighted by others was that it helped to 
maintain Cohesion policy reform on the political agenda, not least by having taken better 
consideration of overarching EU objectives (namely, Europe 2020) than the earlier 
reflections paper by the previous Commissioner Hübner. The main criticisms include limited 
follow-up, as the paper was overshadowed by the Europe 2020 strategy and the forthcoming 
Cohesion Report; excessive attention on technical issues, including several proposals that 
were considered confusing or difficult to put into practice; and, when reading between the 
lines, to have adopted the already known line of DG Regional Policy.  
The setting up of a High-Level Group to reflect on the future of Cohesion policy is a novel 
feature of this period, mirroring existing practices in other EU policy fields. The rationale 
for establishing this informal advisory group, composed of policy experts from the 
Commission and the Member States, was to support the Commission in developing the main 
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building blocks of its legislative proposals on the future Cohesion policy. The formal 
mandate was to discuss future policy directions, to ensure transparency between the 
Commission and Member States and to offer a forum for contributing to the preparatory 
process and exchanging views between national policy-makers. As an advisory group, the 
discussions and outputs are not binding, nor does the group replace other formal structures 
(the Structural Actions Working Group or the Committee on the Coordination of the Funds). 
While the establishment of the HLG was announced by Commissioner Hübner in February 
2009, the first meeting was not held till October 2009, followed by four further meetings 
between December 2009 and June 2010 covering issues such as territorial cooperation, 
conditionalities and incentives, and financial management.  
Most of the national policymakers regarded the HLG as a useful deliberation forum and 
welcomed its contribution to more openness and ownership of the reform process. The 
background and issues on the reform agenda have become clearer to the participants as a 
result and it has helped to ensure that the Commission is informed (and takes account of) 
Member State realities and views. At the domestic level, the HLG process is reported to 
have usefully contributed to engagement and meetings with Ministers responsible for 
Cohesion policy in some countries, although it has also been onerous for officials to brief 
the high-level representatives on the implications of some of the technical issues discussed. 
Another benefit reported by policymakers is that it allows Member State representatives to 
meet informally at EU level, eliminating the need for bilateral meetings between them. 
Lastly, it has filled an institutional void. In the previous reform period, it was not always 
clear where certain discussions should take place  and the COCOF (then, CDCR) comitology 
group was not always regarded as the appropriate place. The HLG is considered to have 
resolved this issue, providing an ideal forum for the discussion of strategic issues. Some 
policymakers argue that the group should continue to discharge this role after the expiry of 
its mandate at the end of 2010.  
On the other hand, the extent and level of strategic debate in the HLG has been 
questioned. Some participants consider that the discussions were absorbed too much by 
practical and technical issues rather than conceptual issues. The more in-depth discussions 
were on management issues and the content of the new financial regulations in particular, 
although these topics were considered important by others who welcomed the opportunity 
to influence Commission thinking. The quality of the meeting discussions was also regarded 
as being variable, depending very much on the facilitation abilities of the Commission chair 
or the knowledge of the individuals sent by Member States. In some cases, junior 
representatives were sent or scripted statements were read instead of engaging in real 
discussion. In this respect, one participant considered the group to have been a missed 
opportunity to draw on the knowledge of very senior people who were ready to discuss 
strategic issues.  
Operational draw-backs raised by some participants included the lack of language 
interpretation, which made it hard to follow the discussions for some participants, and the 
lack of structure and scope for preparation. For instance, for one meeting the delegates 
were reported to have received guidance notes and questions only two days prior to the 
meeting. In comparison, the organisation of ad hoc group on the future of ESF was 
considered by some to have been more strategic and structured, particularly in terms of the 
Setting the stage for the reform of Cohesion policy after 2013 
European Policies Research Paper, No. 77  European Policies Research Centre 54
production of a draft interim report on the discussions and then a final report and 
opinion.57 Related, the outcomes of the HLG appear to have been limited so far. The group 
has not agreed on concrete ideas or solutions and seems unlikely to do so until the 
Commission has put forward more detailed proposals. 
5.3 EU perspectives: the Fifth Cohesion Report 
The Fifth Cohesion Report is currently being finalised and is due for publication in 
November 2010. In addition to its analytical role in assessing the state of cohesion in the EU, 
the Report will bring together the conclusions of research and debate with a series of 
proposals for 2014-2020. At it heart is a conception of Cohesion policy as a delivery vehicle 
for achieving the Europe 2020 objectives of smart, inclusive and sustainable growth, while 
recognising the founding Treaty-based objective of cohesion. It will propose several ways 
for enhancing the European added value of the policy through greater concentration, 
conditionalities and a performance focus, and it will seek to streamline and simplify the 
delivery system.  
x Territorial cohesion: A starting point for the future reform is the explicit recognition 
of territorial cohesion as a policy objective in the new Lisbon Treaty. However, this 
is unlikely to have major implications because the principle remains undefined and 
subject to different interpretations, as the Territorial Cohesion Green Paper exercise 
made clear. The stance of DG Regio on the concept has been to emphasise two 
particular dimensions. The first is the process dimension in which the policys multi-
level governance model is often presented as the panacea to the ownership failings 
of the Lisbon strategy due to its ability to involve different actors and stakeholder at 
multiple territorial levels. But it is not clear how the regulatory requirements for 
partnership can or will be changed to enhance the role of sub-national actors in 
policy design or delivery. The second dimension concerns specific territorial features 
that merit particular attention. While the Treaty refers to a number of such features, 
successive DG Regio Commissioners have placed a particular emphasis on urban 
problems and the role of local authorities, potentially through specific earmarked 
funding. In addition, macro-regional strategies have risen up the political agenda, 
building on the experiences with the EUs strategies for the Baltic Sea and Danube.  
x Strategic programming and concentration: the need for close coordination with 
Europe 2020 has clearly informed the Commissions proposals, requiring clearer 
guidance at European level and a potentially more strategically-oriented negotiation 
process and follow-up. As at present, a Strategic Framework would be drawn up at 
EU level to translate the targets and objectives of Europe 2020 into investment 
priorities for Cohesion Policy covering the Structural Funds, which could also extend 
to the European Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development. The Commission is likely to propose a reinforced NSRF, potentially with 
a more contractual or binding status, including more regular reporting. At the 
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programme level, a more focused and restrictive prioritisation on Europe 2020 will be 
proposed, particularly in the more developed regions.  
x Conditionality and incentives: The Commission has already indicated that it intends 
to strengthen the role of Cohesion Policy in the EU reformed economic governance 
system through the use of conditionalities and incentives. These would target two 
themes: 
o Structural and institutional reforms: Member States would be required to 
introduce structural and institutional reforms in those areas directly linked 
to the operation of Cohesion Policy, such as regulatory and administrative 
burdens on businesses, environment protection, flexicurity policies, etc. 
Their fulfilment could either constitute a prerequisite for allocating funding 
at the start of the period or the basis for suspending future payments 
following Commission review and assessment.  
o Macroeconomic conditions and the SGP: Fiscal conditionality would be 
extended from the Cohesion Fund to all Structural Funds to ensure the 
respect of key macro economic conditions and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. In cases of non-compliance with the rules or of repeated breaches of 
the Pact, current or future allocations would be suspended or cancelled 
x Other instruments which could be employed to enhance effectiveness include a 
performance reserve at EU level to reward progress toward Europe 2020 targets. In 
addition, the Commission may propose to be granted additional resources to directly 
support experimentation and networking along the lines of the innovative actions of 
previous periods. 
x Evaluation: the Commission is keen to ensure that ex-ante evaluations focus on 
improving programme design such that the achievement of objectives and targets can 
be monitored and evaluated, and the need for the Member States to adopt more 
rigorous evaluation methodologies is a well-known challenge. More priority to 
evaluation could be encouraged through a requirement to develop evaluation plans as 
has been done in some Member States voluntarily in this period. The Commission has 
also indicated that the Member States should prepare summative reports synthesising 
the on-going evaluations they conduct during the programming period, which could 
feed into the Commissions ex-post evaluation work. 
x New financial instruments: The Commission is particularly keen on expanding the 
use of financial engineering instruments within Cohesion Policy, given the leverage 
effects in the context of a relatively limited budget. Greater clarity and 
differentiation between rules governing repayable forms of assistance relative to 
direct grants is also needed. 
x Simplifying management and administration: A particularly salient issue is the need 
to simplify the audit and control requirements. The most likely proposal is to 
introduce greater differentiation, by focusing on programmes where there is greater 
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risk based on the track record and relaxing requirements elsewhere. The facilitation 
of the partial closure of programmes is also likely to be sought. Proposals being 
floated to support this include the introduction of an annual clearance of accounts 
procedure. Encouraging the use of the simplified costs method of reimbursement, as 
introduced for the current period, could also simplify financial management and 
reduce administrative burdens. Simplification of the n+2 rule is also likely to be 
proposed, particularly at the start of a programme period. Lastly, on expenditure 
eligibility the key issue on which the Commission has been working on is the 
harmonisation of rules for different structural Funds and also with Research Policy. 
5.4 National perspectives 
Turning now to the national perspective on the reform of Cohesion policy, the remainder of 
this section explores some of the above themes in more detail based on interviews with 
national policymakers. 
5.4.1 Strategic priorit ies  
The Europe 2020 strategy has provided a focal point for reflection on the future priorities of 
all EU policies. From the perspective of Cohesion policy, it is of note that the strategy 
underlined that “ economic, social  and t erri t orial  cohesion wil l  remain at  t he heart  of  t he 
Europe 2020 st rat egy t o ensure t hat  al l  energies and capacit ies are mobil ised and focused 
on t he pursuit  of  t he st rat egy's priorit ies. Cohesion pol icy and st ruct ural  funds, while 
import ant  in t heir own right , are key del ivery mechanisms t o achieve t he priorit ies of  
smart , sustainable and inclusive growt h in Member St at es and regions.”   
DG Regional Policy will be publishing Communications on the contribution of Cohesion 
policy to Europe 2020 and, in the meantime, has been actively defending its role, not only 
as the largest source of multi-sector finance for Europe 2020, but also because the strategy 
requires the EU to demonstrate that its instruments are working together and because the 
goals cannot be achieved unless the regions achieve them.58 From this angle, DG Regio 
argues that the relevance of Cohesion Policy to Europe 2020 is high and clear-cut: it 
provides an integrated framework for investment; a tried and tested delivery system; and 
increases ownership on the ground. Furthermore, it argues that the policys objectives 
already have a close fit with the EU 2020 priorities  knowledge-based smart growth, 
empowering people in inclusive societies and green growth  but adding a critical place-
based dimension, as illustrated below.59 
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Figure 5: Cohesion policy logical diagram 
 
Source: Ahner (2010) 
 
Similar views have been expressed by national policymakers. There is universal agreement 
that EU Cohesion policy should be aligned with Europe 2020 and its key objectives. The 
three EU 2020 priorities are seen as being highly relevant and, to a large extent, in line 
with the current Lisbon agenda focus of the programmes. However, several criticisms 
against the strategy and the implications for Cohesion policy have been raised:  
x the EU 2020 strategy formulation process lacked reflection on the successes and 
failures of the Lisbon Strategy, which is necessary to inform the strategic approach to 
cohesion; 
x a sectoral approach dominates the EU 2020 strategy, which does not provide a strong 
rationale for Cohesion policy - the principle of cohesion is mentioned, but it could be 
more visible with explicit encouragement of a territorial approach towards all EU 
policies;  
x while Cohesion policy should be closely aligned with EU 2020 and can make an 
important contribution, it should not be shouldered with unrealistic responsibility for 
promoting EU growth or lose sight of its founding treaty-based objectives;  
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x the generality of EU 2020 means that almost any activity would be possible to justify 
by reference to one of the three priorities and no positive lead is provided for 
policymakers at the national and regional levels; and 
x more attention could be given to specific development drivers or challenges, such as: 
demographic change (in line with the ageing agenda), geographical handicaps (as 
recognised in the Treaty) and a broader interpretation of innovation (focusing on 
user- and demand-driven innovation and social innovation in addition to the more 
traditional technology- and supply-driven innovation concepts).   
With specific reference to the European Social Fund, the Member States have agreed a 
series of general principles regarding the funds scope and priorities in light of Europe 
2020.60 
x The ESF should be fully aligned with the objectives and priorities of Europe 2020. The 
ESF should underpin the three priorities of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Employment, 
training and education, active inclusion and equal opportunities policies are key 
engines for empowering people by developing their knowledge and skills, promoting a 
culture of innovation, boosting employment levels (including in the area of green and 
white jobs), and fostering an inclusive labour market.  
x The ESF priorities should be based on the policy objectives of the Integrated 
Guidelines, and especially on the Employment Guidelines  
x The ESF should enhance its support for institutional capacity building and structural 
reforms to social partners and to partnership with civil society, in particular with 
NGOs and associations that work with the most disadvantaged people 
x Gender equality, anti-discrimination and transnationality should remain key 
horizontal priorities for the ESF in the next programming period. 
x Social innovation should be enhanced in the next programming period in employment 
and active inclusion policies. 
x New and smart financial engineering to blend grants and loans are needed to increase 
the resources available for employment and inclusion policies using the leverage of 
the ESF. 
A critical question for Cohesion policy is how can strategic EU priorities best be translated 
into specific national and regional contexts? The general view is that a combination of top-
down joint priorities and bottom-up initiative is needed for the approach to succeed. Put 
differently, there is agreement on the need for greater concentration, but sufficient 
flexibility is also called for to adapt EU priorities to different domestic contexts. Flexibility 
is interpreted in two different ways by the Member States:  
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x freedom for national and sub-national actors to devise place-specific solutions within 
high-level, non-prescriptive EU priorities; and 
x freedom for national and sub-national actors to use a proportion of the funds for 
priorities that are not aligned with narrowly-defined EU priorities.  
This view is echoed in the ESF Committees opinion, which recognises t he need t o achieve 
a bet t er t hemat ic concent rat ion of  ESF support  in order t o ensure t hat  intervent ions have 
a t angible impact  and achieve a crit ical  mass. Thus, a l imit ed number of  priorit ies should 
be chosen at  operat ional  programme level . The number of  priorit ies may vary according t o 
nat ional  and regional needs and t o t he ESF amount s al located.61 
At the operational or expenditure level, there are mixed views about the use of earmarking 
to achieve concentration. In line with the views on EU priorities, most policymakers are 
concerned about the imposition of a top-down or excessively restrictive approach on 
programmes. In this vein, one proposal suggested to achieve flexible concentration is to 
reduce the number of earmarking categories but to use wider definitions. By contrast, some 
national policymakers would like to see a more focused approach by applying the 
earmarking principle consistently across all EU Member States  including clarification of 
existing categories definitions - and enforced more strictly. 
5.4.2 Performance 
A key element of the debate on the future is how to make the policy more performance-
oriented. The potential for greater use of financial conditionalities and incentives has 
been a prominent feature of the discussions. Such proposals have, however, been viewed 
with scepticism by national policymakers. Methodological challenges are often raised as the 
main obstacle, both in terms of measuring causation and designing appropriate indicators 
and targets. The difficulties in measuring performance and attributing unambiguous causal 
effects to Cohesion policy interventions are widely known, particularly given the complexity 
and variety of policy fields covered. It is also difficult to select indicators and targets that 
would be reliable enough to be used for imposing financial penalties in a rigorous and 
objective way; applying them at EU level would be especially challenging given the 
different approaches, methods and definitions used within and across countries, which 
hampers aggregation and comparability of programme performance. Beyond these 
methodological challenges, a series of other difficulties are often mentioned:  
x additional administrative burden, especially in countries with low funding;  
x more conservative and risk-averse programme management and projects selection;  
x increased politicisation due to the potential for losing money;  
x unfair penalisation of lagging regions, which tend to have weaker institutional 
capacity and more challenging and complex programmes to administer;  
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x practical implementation difficulties given the preparatory work needed to design 
and negotiate indicators and targets;  
Nevertheless, some policy-makers do see the potential for using financial mechanisms to 
enhance performance under certain conditions.  First, greater concentration on specific 
themes and interventions at the programming stage is needed as a pre-condition, tying in 
with the previous discussion on core priorities.  Second, they should be applied within 
countries rather than at EU level. This is already being done at programme level in some 
countries in the current period (e.g. Italy, Poland) but it remains to be seen how effectively 
this will improve the focus on performance and attainment of goals. Project-level 
conditionalities are also widely used and could be encouraged. Third, strict enforcement is 
required. For instance, a recent report by the French parliament favours the introduction 
of a national performance reserve, but only if it employs a genuinely incentivising approach 
that compensates the best performing programmes alone. Fourth, the possibility of 
introducing output or result-based conditionalities will depend on the type of interventions 
or objectives being pursued.62 Lastly, the creation of a performance reserve at EU level is 
more likely to prosper if it is created from decommitted funds. Excellence criteria could be 
set for such a fund, for example in terms of innovative or experimental projects and 
involving a more autonomous role for the Commission in selection processes. A supra-
national dimension could also be introduced - where a stronger role for the Commission is 
more justifiable - by focusing on macro-regions within the EU.  
A final point emphasised by national policymakers is that there is more scope for the use of 
financial incentives rather than sanctions. Peer review is regarded as an interesting, though 
not unproblematic, option. The OECD model of territorial reviews of regional policies is 
often cited as providing a promising lead, and there are similar approaches used in other EU 
policy areas. The reinforcement of existing initiatives for best-practice exchange and 
knowledge transfer (such as the RegioStars awards and the Open Days) are generally 
supported, although the impact of these soft activities on the performance focus of 
programmes is considered to be limited. 
Reinforced monitoring and evaluation offers another potential avenue for strengthening 
the performance orientation of Cohesion policy.  In this respect, the present period is widely 
regarded as a positive step. The emphasis on ongoing evaluation and more flexibility to 
undertake thematic or operational needs-based evaluations is universally supported. The 
breadth and diversity of evaluation topics being analysed across the EU suggests that it is 
being increasingly employed as a learning tool, as opposed to a formal compliance routine. 
Monitoring indicators and systems have also been improved, involving the streamlining and 
standardisation of indicators, the use of early-warning indicators to trigger evaluations and 
more comprehensive and robust IT systems. Yet, ongoing difficulties persist.  
x Methodological challenges associated with demonstrating causality, the limited use of 
advanced or experimental methods, and coordination and data comparability 
difficulties within countries or at EU level.  
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x The exploitation of results for strategic planning and implementation purposes is 
limited, and it is often not possible to generate fast and up-to-date information.  
x Capacity challenges are regularly reported due to onerous information requirements 
for beneficiaries and programme managers, and a lack of skills or resources within 
the public sector or in the evaluation market. 
Recommendations by national policymakers to address these issues and improve the general 
state of monitoring and evaluation practice include the following: 
x continue and further encourage the move towards flexible, ongoing evaluation 
approaches, with a particular onus on strategically relevant indicators and 
evaluations focusing on specific strategic themes and on impact; 
x improve the quality of monitoring data and the consistency of indicator definitions 
across Member States and regions. The definition of common core indicators at EU-
level has been proposed by the DG Regio, but this would need to happen soon so that 
the programme managers were informed and could incorporate these into their post-
2013 planning; 
x strengthen national and sub-national capacities. This could take the form of training 
or institution-building, as in Portugal and Poland where statistical observatories have 
been set up at regional level during this period to boost monitoring and evaluation 
capacity; 
x adopt more rigorous evaluations methods, including counterfactual and other 
experimental methodologies. This is an area where the Commission could readily 
support evaluation units and programme managers by providing guidance and tools; 
and 
x to encourage more political buy-in through regulatory incentives, although most 
Member States consider that stricter regulatory requirements are not necessary and 
could be counterproductive. 
More structured strategic reporting and high-level debate is regarded as a necessary 
condition for enhancing accountability over policy performance.  However, the first 
experience in 2009/10 reveals significant limitations, mirroring some of the criticism raised 
above on monitoring. The exercise has often been treated as a compliance exercise rather 
than a genuine learning tool. Some policymakers consider that the reports were mainly 
about providing a positive image rather than a full, objective account of what was 
happening on the ground. Timing constraints were partly to blame. It was still early in the 
programme period and only limited funds had been spent, but it also proved difficult to 
aggregate data in countries where there is no common monitoring database across all 
programmes or where indicators and monitoring systems are designed at programme level. 
Strategic, high-level debate on the reports was also limited. The General Affairs Council 
discussions concentrated mostly on the elaboration of Council conclusions, and 
presentations of the national reports in the COCOF committee were brief and primarily for 
information purposes.  
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To improve the quality and utility of the strategic reports, the main suggestions by national 
policymakers are reducing their scope to concentrate on strategic issues, and, for the next 
period, agreeing on core indicators to allow comparison across countries. The need for a 
more structured debate has received mixed reactions. Some policymakers oppose Council-
level debates on the grounds that they cannot generate any real learning given the 
complexity of the issues at stake, especially in a political environment, or because many 
countries simply do not have Regional Policy Ministers.  In this respect, the current informal 
council meetings are seen to be a good opportunity to talk about strategy, although these 
meetings are often attended by Director Generals rather than political representatives. 
Similarly, the recently created HLG could represent a good platform for such tasks. On the 
other hand, it is argued by others that a more structured and formalised system at both the 
political and technocratic levels is needed to diffuse and exploit the (often interesting) 
national experiences and lessons that emerge from these fora.  
Institutional capacity is increasingly recognised as being critical to effective performance. 
Among the national policymakers interviewed, it was generally felt that the main problems 
lay in the EU12 due to high staff turnover, a lack of experience in implementing Cohesion 
policy and less modernised administrative cultures. On the other hand, it was also argued 
that there was scope in all Member States to improve their institutional capacities. 
Horizontal and vertical policy coordination is an ongoing challenge in all countries, as is the 
ability to devise and implement place-based approaches to sectoral policies.  
Whether the Commission should be more proactively involved is an open question. National 
policymakers consider institutional capacity to be a domestic matter, unless capacity 
deficits threaten legal compliance with EU rules. On the other hand, it is argued that the 
Commission could provide greater oversight on how technical assistance is being deployed, 
particularly in terms of the quality of the interventions funded. Other softer types of 
intervention where the Commission could take a more proactive role include benchmarking 
of national experiences or training. But rather than focusing on compliance issues  as in 
the train the trainers seminars  the Commission could address more strategic and 
thematic issues. This, in turn, requires stronger institutional capacity within the 
Commission. 
5.4.3 Strategic coherence 
The extent of coordination and coherence between EU policies is widely regarded as being 
sub-optimal, as is the degree to which cohesion objectives are taken on board outside the 
EUs structural policies. The introduction of an overarching EU strategy for cohesion could 
help to remedy this deficit, but it is also recognised by national policymakers that a single 
strategic framework for cohesion policy, rural development policy and maritime and 
fisheries policy would be more feasible. Not all policymakers agree on the benefits of such 
strategic coordination. Sceptics argue that the real issue is how the structural funds are 
implemented and coordinated on the ground, where domestic institutional arrangements 
and interests are the determining factors not the pre-existence on EU strategy. 
Additionally, the effectiveness of the NSRF in translating EU objectives into a coordinated 
national strategy is disputed and in most countries the NSRF is of limited importance in 
steering implementation at the post-planning stage. 
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The pursuit of coordination through radical organisational change within the Commission  
such as the creation of a single DG for all the funds or a strong Coordination DG - is largely 
regarded as utopian. More critical, according to most policymakers, is the need to agree 
on harmonised management rules, eligibility conditions and operational coordination 
between the Structural Funds and with other EU policies. For instance, common eligibility 
conditions between EU Cohesion policy and EU Research Policy would be welcomed, and it 
is argued that enhanced interaction with specialists from the sectoral DGs could contribute 
to improving the quality of programmes. For such interaction to be effective it must be 
targeted and well-coordinated in order to avoid the dangers of mission drift in 
programmes, which can result from the checklist approach to inter-service consultations 
within the Commission. Equally, the limits to operational coordination should not be under-
estimated given the different nature of the different policy areas and the different ways of 
working across DGs. 
At the programme level, a reversion to integrated programmes drawing on all Structural 
Funds is another option to increase coordination. A report from the French Parliament calls 
for the mono-fund arrangements to be reviewed, arguing that the rule reduces the scope 
for synergies between different funds. A recent Polish position paper on Cohesion policy 
reform states that the “ rules on monofunding weaken t he ef f iciency of  t he more and more 
separat ed funds. A ret urn t o t he concept  of  making implementat ion of  int egrat ed proj ects 
possible would be an opt imal solut ion. Then, t he resources f rom t he ESF and t he European 
Regional Development  Fund (ERDF) would provide a meaningful  support  t o int egrat ed 
proj ect s real ising priorit ies def ined at  t he fund level , operat ional and st rat egic 
documents.”  If agreement cannot be reached on integrated programming, an alternative 
proposal by the Polish authorities is to reform the existing cross-financing mechanism to 
allow soft and hard investments to be combined and to increase and differentiate the 
current threshold limits in accordance with the type of intervention.  
The need to achieve more complementarity between the Structural Funds and Rural 
Development policies features prominently in the debate on strategic coherence. Some 
policymakers argue that the current approach is driven by demarcation instead of strategic 
thinking on balanced territorial development and call for the second pillar of CAP to be 
reintegrated under Cohesion Policy. On the other hand, others do not see a need to change 
the status quo and argue that agriculture ministries at national or regional level would 
oppose such changes. An alternative proposal is for more coordination at the strategic 
planning stage through a coordination platform similar to the NSRF or by merging the 
National Rural Strategy with the NSRF.  
5.4.4 Simplificat ion 
The simplification of Cohesion policy has been high on the agenda in recent years, 
particularly in terms of the packages of legislative amendments to facilitate policy 
implementation within the context of the crisis. Looking to the future, the key 
simplification measures being explored concern the tolerable risk of error, management 
and control systems and financial management procedures.  
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As part of the triennial review of the Financial Regulation, the Commission has proposed to 
decide on a level of tolerable risk of error by policy area, which could mean fixing a higher 
tolerable risk level than the current two percent threshold. 63 For Cohesion policy, one 
important step being considered by DG Regio is that errors attributable to problems with 
compliance with State aid, public procurement and environmental legislation could be 
separated out from the errors directly associated with the management and 
implementation of the Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
A prominent idea in the debate on simplification is the introduction of differentiated 
requirements on financial management, audit and control, based on the volume of funding 
or the effectiveness of systems. For instance, a proposal that has been examined in the HLG 
is to exclude programmes below 250 million from the need to receive Commission approval 
for their management and control system. This would apply to more than half of all EU 
programmes, while the vast majority of total funding would be implemented in programmes 
with an approved management and control system. Another proposal where there is more 
universal support is on the use of contracts of confidence, whereby the Commission would 
not undertake controls in those Member States where domestic systems have a good track 
record or the systems are assessed as being effective. The challenge with these proposals is 
to avoid perceptions of double standards being introduced (particularly between old and 
new Member States), while ensuring that the management and control obligations are 
proportionate with the aims pursued. 
There are several areas of financial management where further scope for simplification has 
been identified.   
x Lighter administrative requirements for specific types of interventions or 
beneficiaries: particularly smaller grants, high-risk or innovative interventions, 
financial engineering instruments and specific types of beneficiaries such as small 
firms.   
x A more flexible decommitment rule: by extending the rule by one year (n+3) for all 
Member States or applying it nationally (rather than at programme level). While some 
Member States view this added flexibility positively, others are supportive of the 
financial discipline imposed by the current system.  
x Basing EU reimbursement on the declaration of payments rather than on 
expenditure by beneficiaries: would expedite payments from the Commission 
because they would not be held up by problems with a specific beneficiary, as can 
happen under the existing rules. However, this is not viewed as being of major 
significance by many policymakers and may even encourage lax financial 
management. 
                                                 
63 European Commission (2010) Proposal  for a regulat ion of  t he European Parl iament  and of  t he 
Council  on t he Financial  Regulat ion appl icable t o t he general  budget  of  t he European Union, COM 
2010) 260 final, Brussels, 28.5.2010. 
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x Incentivising partial closure of programmes: could limit errors and omissions in the 
management and monitoring of individual projects (i.e. by avoiding issues with 
incomplete documentation arising later down the line). 
5.4.5 The role of the Commission 
There is general consensus on the need for the Commission to have a more strategic role 
than at present, but what does this mean in practice? At the policy design stage, it is 
argued that the Commission could adopt a more strategic role in defining the role of 
Cohesion policy vis-à-vis other EU policies more clearly. This would not only improve the 
strategic direction of the Structural Funds but also make the institutional and political 
position of DG Regio (and, therefore, its credibility) less tenuous. At the implementation 
stage, it is argued that the Commission should work more on the credibility of the 
strategies, their concrete feasibility and logic and then focus on following-up on practical 
delivery of strategic objectives. However, there are mixed views on the extent to which the 
Commission should be involved in such decisions. Some policymakers are wary about 
excessive Commission interference in the strategic decisions of the Member States, while 
others would welcome a more proactive Commission approach. 
Where there is universal agreement is on the need for a revision to the current approach to 
audit and control. Policymakers argue that it is necessary to move away from the distrustful 
shadow of fraud allegations, for more balance between the audit of legal and procedural 
compliance and the audit of effectiveness, and for a repositioning of the roles of the 
Commission and the Member States. In particular, it is argued that the philosophy of the 
single audit model needs to be genuinely embraced, whereby responsibility for the control 
of projects is devolved to the Member States, with the Commission being responsible, 
above all, for ex-ante verification of domestic management and control systems.  
More generally, policymakers argue that a better relationship is needed with programme 
managers. In the context of Monitoring Committee meetings, for instance, DG Regios 
presence and interventions are sometimes felt to be unnecessary, superfluous or disruptive. 
It is argued that the Commission should be listening more to the regions views and engaging 
in more strategic discussions, rather than concentrating on financial management and 
implementation issues.  
Finally, in pursuing a strategic shift in the role of the Commission, several preconditions are 
considered to be necessary. Additional human resources are needed within the Commission 
DGs, but as the Commission is unlikely to obtain additional personnel, a shift from audit to 
strategic issues would be expected. Related, more training is needed within the Commission 
as it currently lacks the necessary competences to support a strategic approach. More 
effective inter- and intra-DG coordination is also necessary as the well-known 
compartmentalised institutional structure of the Commission presents a significant barrier 
to strategic thinking.  
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6. ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION 
The aim of this paper has been to provide a review of the Cohesion policy debate over the 
past year. It began by setting out the context for reform in terms of economic governance, 
institutional changes and the policy priorities of Europe 2020. It then reviewed the state-of-
play of the budget debate, highlighting different national positions. For Cohesion policy, an 
analysis was provided of one of the key issues underlying Member State positions  their 
eligibility for Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the likely financial allocations, based on 
the latest Eurostat data. Lastly, the political and policy dimensions of Cohesion policy 
reform were reviewed in detail. This final section concludes with some questions for 
discussion at the EoRPA meeting. 
What kind of changes to the Berlin formula for allocating Cohesion policy funding could 
be considered to remain within budgetary limits and ensure sufficiently wide political 
support? 
The analysis of eligibility and allocations concluded that the existing approach to 
Convergence region and Cohesion Fund allocations cannot be reapplied largely unchanged. 
Eligibility would be too low to command the political support for renewal of the policy, and 
the budget would exceed the 2007-13 funding allocation significantly. Among the possible 
modifications to the allocation formula are reduced coefficients, reconfiguration of the 
absorption cap, changes to aid intensity, or changes to the weights allocated to poor 
countries or regions. A more significant change, discussed over the past year, would be the 
creation of a transition category of eligibility for those regions losing eligibility for the 
Convergence objective. 
How should the approach to shared management of Cohesion policy evolve? 
At the heart of the governance of Cohesion policy is the system of shared management 
between the European Commission and Member States. The recent policy debate, most 
notably in the Barca Report, has seen proposals for a different form of contract between 
the EU and national levels, potentially involving much greater emphasis on targets and 
results. Although there has been some progress in this direction in the current period (e.g. 
through strategic reporting), result-oriented contracting would involve a step change in the 
obligations on Member States. 
What kind of conditionalities on Cohesion policy spending would be acceptable to 
Member States? 
The reform debate over the past two years has involved consideration of strengthening the 
performance of the policy through conditionalities and other incentives. The issue of 
conditionality became particularly important in the debates over stabilisation of the euro in 
the face of the high levels of indebtedness of some countries. Three types of possible 
conditionality are: macro-economic conditionalities (e.g. relating to compliance with 
monetary policy rules); structural conditionalities (e.g. ensuring that the structural, 
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regulatory or institutional pre-conditions for effective use of Structural Funds are in place); 
and performance-related conditionality (e.g. linking funding to adequate performance). 
What scope is there for widening the use of different financial instruments? 
The current period has seen the use of new financial instruments such as JEREMIE and 
JESSICA. Financial engineering instruments are used in the regional policies of some 
Member States also. Under Cohesion policy, the use of such instruments could be intensified 
in future, in particular to move policy support away from non-repayable grants, but they do 
depend on having appropriate regulatory frameworks and administrative capacity in place. 
 
